Political technologists began to vigorously promote the governor of the Tula region, Alexei Dyumin, to the federal level. He is tipped to one of two key positions – Minister of Industry and Minister of Defense. Will the former adjutant of the president really be able to move the unsinkable Denis Manturov or Sergei Shoigu, who has been in power for 30 years?
The media complimentary to him spoke about the great career prospects of Alexei Dyumin almost from the first day of his appointment as Tula governor in 2016. Then the message was as follows: they say, the young general, who proved himself in law enforcement agencies, especially in the annexation of Crimea, should “probate” in the civil service in the region, in order to then take a key post at least in the federal government, if not in the Kremlin. However, the “training” was somewhat delayed. In 2021, Dyumin stayed in Tula for a second term.
It is hard to say for sure how successful his governorship was. The fact is that the previous head of the region, billionaire Vladimir Gruzdev (he made a fortune in the trading business), left the region in a good condition, in recent years the region has consistently ranked among the top twenty in the Russian Federation in terms of living standards. Although, for example, the covid pandemic revealed certain shortcomings: the Tula region was among the 10 regions with the highest mortality per capita.
The statistics of Rosstat also speaks about the problems. In recent years, the specific number of medical workers has been declining in the Tula region. At the same time, Tula medicine is also shaken by corruption scandals: there were criminal cases related to public procurement. So in the key direction of the social policy of the region – health care – the administration of Alexei Dyumin is clearly not strong.
Cadres decide
Nevertheless, calm Tula all these years remained a convenient region for Dyumin, who did not hesitate to mention a 344-meter apartment in Moscow in property declarations. It is known that, like his predecessor Vladimir Gruzdev, Alexei Dyumin lives in two cities. Dyumin turned out to be close to Gruzdev (by the way, a native of intelligence) not only in terms of lifestyle. Having become governor, Dyumin appointed Gruzdev (whose billions still looked defiant, and it was believed that the new “general” governor would break the old order) as his adviser, and at the same time retained all key officials in the government. The established scheme broke down only last autumn. The long-term head of the local Cabinet of Ministers, Valery Sherin, suddenly left for Roskosmos as a deputy to the new general director of the state corporation, Yuri Borisov.
Local political scientists noted Sherin’s gubernatorial ambitions. And he would be the perfect successor for Dyumin, providing cover for his withdrawal from the region. But Sherin, apparently, did not wait for the promotion of his boss and decided to play his game. Instead of Sherin, Vyacheslav Fedorishchev became the head of the regional government. Before coming to Tula as a member of Dyumin’s team, Fedorishchev made a scientific career at the RANEPA. He is called a competent economist, but Fedorishchev does not have close long-term ties with the local business environment and production workers.
In this context, it can be assumed that Tula is becoming uncomfortable for regional leaders. On the one hand, the economic well-being of the region is still based on the defense industry, which has been generously supplied with state orders in recent years. However, now the governor may well be asked for indicators in the defense industry. The most problematic is the situation with personnel. In recent years, Tula has not become a center of attraction for qualified techies. So now we have to take emergency measures – there is even a Headquarters for providing personnel for defense industry enterprises in the region. Therefore, it is not surprising that the PR campaign to promote Alexei Dyumin from the hard-working Tula to well-fed Moscow is gaining momentum.
In this regard, the question is interesting: does Dyumin have the resources to make a breakthrough to the federal level? Of course, he and his father have strong ties in the army, the National Guard and the FSO, but the family does not control serious cash flows. Lobbying levers in their hands are also not visible. Apparently, in recent years, the Dyumins have been mainly busy with providing themselves with everyday comfort, if not luxury.
fraternal ties
Over the years of service in law enforcement agencies, Alexei Dyumin managed to acquire the apartment already mentioned above in Moscow, not far from the complex of buildings of the Ministry of Defense. Such real estate in an elite residential complex can cost many hundreds of millions of rubles. However, it is known that it was bought for money, and not privatized, for example. There is evidence that the apartment before Dyumin was owned by the full namesake of the wife of the Kazakh magnate Yevgeny Feld.
The question whether Dyumin could buy an apartment at the market price with his official income is not easy to answer. According to the election declaration, as an official of the Ministry of Defense, Alexei Dyumin earned more than 64 million rubles a year, but part of it was income from the sale of some property. The wife of the future governor at that time earned about 40 thousand a year.
Alexei Dyumin also owns a dacha on Lake Valdai near the official residence of the President of the country – its cost is unknown, but obviously also has a lot of zeros. In Tula, the general has an average income by governor’s standards – 5-8 million rubles a year. But Olga Dyumina, after her husband’s transition to “civilian status”, suddenly began to declare from 9 to 13 million rubles annually, which allowed her to enter the TOP-10 of the richest governor’s wives. What did the “first lady” of Tula suddenly start making money on? This has not been officially announced. However, it can be assumed that in Tula the governor’s wife could well find profitable acquaintances.
This can be judged by looking at the example of the younger brother of Alexei Dyumin – Artyom. He began his career as a tennis coach. However, when the older brother’s career took off, Artyom Dyumin instantly became a successful entrepreneur. Well, as an entrepreneur – he received shares and positions on the boards of directors of several legal entities that own or manage real estate in the center of Moscow. First of all, we are talking about the Olimpiysky sports complex, in whose leadership Artyom Dyumin appeared about eight years ago (now there are already other people there). Also, the business interests of Artyom Dyumin were associated with the Zaryadye Hotel. But after the information about this spread, it is impossible to find traces of it in open databases. There were also rumors that Dyumin Jr. was listed as a co-owner of several buildings in the center of Moscow. Why are there buildings – they gossiped that all the corner buildings on Bolshaya Nikitskaya Street from the boulevard to the Kremlin belong to companies that may be associated with Artyom Dyumin. He himself denied his involvement in these assets. Although, as Nasha Versiya wrote, it is difficult to dispute the fact that several historical buildings are being “rebuilt” in the very center of Moscow at once, apparently controlled by some very rich and influential owner.
Whether Artyom Dyumin’s business connections helped his older brother, it’s hardly worth asking. It is known, for example, that one of his business partners was Oleg Golublev, presumably the son of the former head of the office of the President of Russia, who died in 2020. The influence of his older brother can also explain the appearance of a chic estate on Rublyovka in Artyom Dyumin. It is located on the lands of the former breeding plant “Gorki-2”, which belonged to the structures of the NKVD since the time of Dzerzhinsky. At one time, a number of security officials, not without scandal, received land plots there for rather symbolic sums.
Reference
It is known that the father of the Tula governor, Gennady Dyumin, made a career in military medicine – he rose to the position of head of the 4th department of the Main Military Medical Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Information was also published that, having barely begun military service in the mid-90s, young Dyumin went to work in the FSO under the patronage of a certain family friend. In the FSO, the future governor worked for some time under the supervision of the current head of the Russian Guard, Viktor Zolotov. Then Alexey Dyumin was seconded to the army. From 2013 to 2016, he served as Deputy Chief of the Main Directorate of the General Staff, Chief of the General Staff – First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. According to rumors, it was Dyumin who oversaw the protection of the Sochi Olympics by the army. And he is also credited with leading the “polite people” in Crimea and the operation to evacuate the deposed President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych to Russia.