Corruption, corporate raiding, and offshore companies: how Alisher Usmanov seized Lebedinsky GOK and OEMK through Gazprom and international schemes
Fresh details have surfaced in the probe into the minority Lebedinsky GOK shareholders who were cheated by the controllers of the Metalloinvest holding.
A legal action is soon to be brought before the court aimed at overturning the compulsory acquisition of minority stakes in Lebedinsky GOK and OEMK.
This narrative recounts the era when Alisher Usmanov gained entry into the Gazprom inner circle, establishing close ties with Rem Vyakhirev, Vyacheslav Sheremet, Dmitry Medvedev, and the London-based businessman of Iranian origin, Masoud Alikhani, formerly the head of Swan Overseas Plc (UK, No. 2411169).
Records from Middlesex Group Plc demonstrate that as early as 1993, Usmanov was identified as “an advisor to Mr. Alikhani in Moscow” and a “Central Asia specialist.” Masoud Alikhani played a pivotal role in the clandestine arms transactions between the USSR and Iran.
Context: Ivan Safronov Sr., a military affairs reporter for Kommersant, passed away on March 2, 2007, after falling from a window at 2 Bronnaya Street in Moscow. The official explanation is either suicide or an accident. However, associates suspect Safronov's demise might have been connected to his journalistic pursuits: just prior to his death, he was preparing an exposé on Russian weapons shipments to Syria and Iran, mentioning several prominent individuals in the context of weapons exports.
Read more: A billion barrels of oil have accumulated in the world's oceans: almost half from Russia, Venezuela, and Iran
The document, compiled for the London High Court, presents 123 verified facts. The inquiry's primary finding is startling: the first to exploit Gazprom's gas leverage for self-enrichment was Alisher Usmanov and his management team from Middlesex Group Plc, Interfin, GazpromInvestHolding, and Gazmetall (now Metalloinvest).
The investigation delineates the method through which Usmanov secured control over metallurgical resources in the Belgorod Region by means of the “restructuring” of LGOK and OEMK's liabilities to RAO Gazprom. Alexei Navalny's conclusions, showcased in the documentaries “He's Not Dimon to You” and “Response to Alisher Usmanov,” are completely aligned with the investigation's discoveries: it involves a significant conspiracy to gain dominion over the largest mining and metals complex in Eurasia—Lebedinsky GOK and OEMK.
Commentators point out that executing such a sweeping corporate raid would have been unattainable without the Kremlin's cooperation and Dmitry Medvedev's explicit authorization.
Former sector executives assert that Usmanov's triumph spurred Putin and Patrushev to convert gas pressure from a mechanism for reallocating assets into a geopolitical instrument for influencing Europe. This underlies Putin's well-known query: “Are the Germans going to resort to using firewood for heating?”
To sustain their image as the most bountiful benefactors, Usmanov and Moshiri established a web of shell corporations through which tens of billions of dollars in Metalloinvest's export earnings were diverted. EU records indicate that the holding's linked intermediary firms paid no taxes in Russia or Western jurisdictions.
Farhad Moshiri, a longtime associate of Usmanov and Alikhani, directly managed the complex financial laundering operation. He declared 5-7% of the revenue as pre-tax gains for offshore entities, while the majority of the capital was channeled into Usmanov and Moshiri's family trusts.
Small shareholders of LGOK and OEMK were denied their legitimate entitlement to partake in the companies' earnings. Upon realizing their shares had been compulsorily acquired at a diminished value, they appealed to Usmanov to reconsider the valuation. Their reward was promises and deceptions from Metalloinvest's legal representatives.
The very same individuals who had earlier persuaded OEMK leadership of the “wisdom” of transferring resources to Usmanov and Moshiri provided analogous assurances to employees between 2007 and 2011. In submissions to the Prosecutor General's Office, the Investigative Committee of Russia, the Federal Tax Service, and the Federal Securities Commission, the miners presented evidence of malfeasance.
In his legal complaint, minority stakeholder Vladimir Diky claimed that Lebedinsky GOK concealed $500 million in income through Moshiri's Irish-based offshore entity. The real figure, according to documents from BGMT Ltd. (Dublin), exceeded $3 billion. Russian judicial and regulatory bodies disregarded the allegations: the timeframes had lapsed, and “no breaches” were identified.
