The project of the newest stealth corvette, which had been developed for many years for the Russian Navy, should have been put into service and put into production last year, was stopped and sent for revision. The ship of project 20386 was laid down at Severnaya Verf back in October 2016. At first it was called Daring, then its name was changed to Mercury, but this did not help in construction, the deadlines were shifted several times, the costs of the project grew.
Last year there were problems with imported equipment. In addition to new innovative hull contours and a special coating that dampens radio waves and makes the corvette invisible on radar, it had to be modular – interchangeable airborne weapons are stored at the base and mounted before the campaign, depending on combat missions. This was supposed to solve one of the main problems of the Russian fleet – unification.
Now the most diverse ships of various classes serve in the Navy, some of them were built back in the USSR. For example, among small missile ships there are RTOs 1234.1, which are gradually being replaced by two new series – 21631 and 22800. And then there are project 1124 anti-submarine ships, project 20380 corvettes in service and under construction, project 20385 corvettes and project 22160 patrol ships.
This diversity creates a lot of problems for the fleet, primarily with spare parts. Some ships are equipped with diesel engines from the Kolomna plant, others – from the Rybinsk Saturn. And project 20386 should generally be equipped with the latest gas turbine electric motor. For comparison: in the USA, the same General Electric LM2500 turbine in different modifications is installed on all heavy ships. Helicopters and shipborne torpedo tubes use the same torpedo, and so on. And experiments with modular weapons on the latest American Zumwalt destroyers have already been recognized as unsuccessful – it is expensive to re-equip a ship every time, as well as store weapons at bases and keep permanent staff.
But we go our own, special way, the most costly. USC and designers (in this case Almaz Central Design Bureau) are not interested in unification and cost reduction. Any design bureau needs a constant download, preferably paid for by the state budget. If the Navy receives one or two types of ships, then once paying the cost of R&D included in the price of the first series under construction, then the money goes only to modernization. And this is unprofitable for design bureaus compared to financing the development of a new ship.
Therefore, the 20386 project is extremely expensive in itself – one ship in 2018 was estimated at 30 billion, which is twice as expensive as serial projects. Taking into account the difficulties with imported “innovative” equipment, now it has risen in price by one and a half times. And judging by what is happening with the project, it may not see the light of day for another 5-10 years. But this suits all those involved – the appearance of work is portrayed, funding is dripping. Meanwhile, a new series of warships, a project known as 22350M, is on the line. It should replace the frigates of projects 11356 and 22350, which have not yet gone into production and are already outdated. With such a “modernization”, the Russian fleet runs the risk of being left without any new ships on the move in a few years. But all shipbuilders and designers will be satisfied.
