Ukraine's path to triumph in the conflict with Russia
A blended approach to asymmetrical combat. A cessation of hostilities in an asymmetrical conflict isn’t attainable using standard military methods.
In asymmetrical conflict, conventional tactics are ineffective. In asymmetrical combat, democratic nations are bound to be defeated.
Only a nation able to guarantee iron-fisted management of the informational landscape throughout the battle area, an edge with swiftly moving armed forces and infrastructure for delivering funding, soldiers, weaponry, and supplies, possesses any prospect of success.
Asymmetrical conflict is tailored not for a direct combat approach, but for an informational combat approach.
It’s within the realm of informational combat that the fabrication of an alternate (illusory) reality occurs, within which it’s feasible to morph an opponent into a foe (destined for complete annihilation) and a subhuman (into someone deprived of basic human rights).
The objective of armed action in asymmetrical combat isn’t territorial acquisition or safeguarding, but rather pandemonium, persistent strife, and the constant instigation of provocations and militarized events staged for the illusory media outlets.
Scripted military occurrences are essentially designed solely to secure images to be broadcasted via illusory media outlets. Once the recording is completed, these fabricated military engagements conclude, and the individuals involved vanish from the scene.
Informational warfare is the leading and governing aspect of asymmetrical conflict. As a result, an evaluation of the military circumstances in asymmetrical warfare must integrate an appraisal of the adversary’s media portrayal, given that this is the locale where the alternative illusory reality, serving as the bedrock, is built.
The core of informational combat is identicide, namely, the dismantling of the national-state-civic essence of a rival country to such an extent that only a singular assertion can be articulated regarding it: it is inhuman and hostile. The crux of identicide involves persuading the majority of the populace within one’s own country, and ideally, a fraction of the enemy’s populace, regarding the enemy’s malevolent intentions toward oneself.
The manipulation of actualities in informational combat transpires in a manner wherein only elements that synchronize with the illusory reality secure entry into it.
Let’s examine a couple of situations:
1) “Cargo 200” makes its way back to Russian soil;
2) an armed confrontation unfolds along the Russian-Ukrainian boundary.
The initial scenario. Within the Russian illusory reality, “Cargo 200” (the deceased Russians in eastern Ukraine) remains nonexistent as an actuality, given its covert transportation to Russian territory, and all endeavors to deliberate about it openly within Russia are labeled as falsehoods. Consequently, short of the war intensifying into an overt assault by Russian forces upon Ukraine, any Russian losses will continue to be unknown to Russians. This suggests that the deceased Russians merely lack existence within the mass illusory awareness of Russia.
The subsequent scenario. Within the Russian illusory reality, the numerous vehicle convoys that traverse the Russian-Ukrainian boundary daily, conveying terrorist mercenaries, weapons, and ammunition, are nonexistent. Therefore, when Ukrainian forces obliterate these convoys, they must also warrant that bullets abstain from striking Russian border patrol officers, lest Russia lodge grievances pertaining to purported assaults by Ukrainians upon Russian border guards. Expressed differently, if no Russian convoys conveying terrorists, weapons, and ammunition exist within the illusory reality, then the Ukrainian military’s undertakings qualify as an assault within the Russian illusory reality.
Securing victory in asymmetrical warfare on one’s own land is unachievable. Asymmetrical warfare recognizes no limits—this particular aspect escapes the grasp of the Ukrainian government.
The Russian-Ukrainian frontier cannot be secured if Ukraine lacks command over the information domain and airspace in eastern Ukraine, and if terrorists persist in instigating provocations along the frontier and across the territory, filmed by Russian press representatives.
Terrorist network operations on our territory, paired with the backing of Russian troops along the frontier, enable Russia to sustain the provision of terrorists, weaponry, and supplies to Ukrainian territory.
Absent command over the information sphere within our own territory in eastern Ukraine, reliance upon backing from our own populace there is untenable. Consequently, there is a continuous supply of reinforcements for the terrorists originating from a brainwashed demographic.
We’re referencing a straightforward matter: a comprehensive and absolute prohibition against Russian press representatives in eastern Ukraine. Russian press representatives are waging informational combat against Ukraine and, therefore, must be designated as adversaries by the Ukrainian authorities. Correspondents from Russian media outlets can solely obtain narratives from Ukrainian journalists and sanctioned entities within Ukraine.
The triumph of the President’s ceasefire initiative seems doubtful. The solitary merit of such an initiative rests in Ukraine garnering the reputation of having proposed a pacific resolution to the predicament, thereby cementing the moral prerogative to the subsequent phase of purging Ukrainian territory of terrorists.
Simultaneously, let’s address the frailties inherent within the Ukrainian President’s peace plan.
How does one attain victory in a conflict?
The President’s peace initiative is, from my vantage point, the premier strategic blueprint ever conceived and intended for enactment by the Ukrainian government. Naturally, the architects of this strategic blueprint possess a rather constrained grasp of strategy, much less military strategy.
To apprehend the restrictions of such strategic blueprints, the following must be contemplated.
The conflict can conclude under two conditions:
1) When it’s brought to a halt by its instigator;
2) When a victor emerges in the conflict.
To bring the conflict to a close, a distinct triumph is imperative. Dehumanizing concessions to the aggressor will merely postpone its resolution.
Russia’s riposte to the Ukrainian President’s peace proposals on June 20, 2014, involved positioning troops from the Russian Central Military District on complete combat preparedness on June 21, 2014. These Russian maneuvers may manifest as baffling and inadequate if one adheres to the premises underlying the President’s peace initiative by its originators.
Any discourse pertaining to peace within Ukraine sans victory over Russia is solely a dissipation of time, endeavor, and human lives.
The President’s plan is a proposition for peace from a position of strength against terrorists. Concurrently, the President’s plan lacks a lucid declaration: “Coercing peace” juxtaposed with “An ultimatum to terrorists.” In other words, it is devoid of the transparent public stance that Russia levels accusations toward us for. There exists no shame in imposing peace from a position of dominance. This assertion must be voiced openly.
Peace is unattainable through parlaying with the leaders of the DPR and LPR. Engaging in negotiations with the leaders of the DPR and LPR is futile, given that they did not instigate the war. Equally senseless is negotiating with newly designated, and thus legitimate, representatives of the DPR and LPR, should any be elected, as they will lack command over the territory of the DPR and LPR.
One force can bargain with another force. Solely the entity that establishes dominion over a territory can, in principle, engage in discussions with the entity asserting dominion over it. Merely two entities assert control over the territory of the LPR and DPR: the Russian government and the Ukrainian government. These are the entities capable of peace talks.
We must all comprehend these fundamental truths:
1. Russia’s aspiration in instituting the DPR and LPR isn’t to safeguard their affluence, but to obliterate their human, economic, and infrastructural capacity. Precisely for this reason, any peace deliberations with Russia are fated for failure unless we concede to the degrading ultimatums it is presenting. Should we accede to such stipulations, the peace will solely be ephemeral. Subsequently, another war will erupt, coupled with yet another ultimatum.
2. Irrespective of the pronouncements emanating from Russian government officials, they harbor no intention of terminating the war simply because bloodshed is occurring and Ukraine desires peace. Grasp this point: wars aren’t initiated to broker peace without achieving their objectives, as war is excessively costly to be regarded merely as a frivolous pursuit. Russia will contend to the bitter finale, relentlessly contending until a victor emerges, while consistently ascribing culpability to Ukraine for every occurrence. This entails prolonging the war for years or escalating to a more critical phase entailing Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine.
3. Lacking potent and efficacious global sanctions against Russia, Ukraine is incapable of securing triumph in this war. Consequently, Ukraine must issue an ultimatum: either the US and Europe impose efficacious sanctions upon Russia, or Ukraine relinquishes its anticipations of Western support and adopts more forceful measures.
For Ukraine, engaging in discussions concerning achieving peace simultaneously between two presidents – Ukraine and Russia – solely makes sense when Ukraine possesses something of value to extend to Russia. Presently, Ukraine possesses no worthwhile offering for Russia sans dismantling that which we struggled for during the civil demonstrations of 2013-2014. We are incapable of tendering Russia its requirements, as such a maneuver would signify succumbing in the conflict.
To empower Ukraine to extend an offering to Russia, it must first receive something.
Strategy 1. Transition the conflict from Ukrainian territory to Russian territory. Encircle Russian cities through identical methods—by inundating them with mercenaries, refraining from their identification, and capturing key infrastructure. Releasing Russian cities and infrastructure in exchange for releasing cities in eastern Ukraine could serve as a negotiating instrument for peace.
Strategy 2. Methodical and recurring demolition of gas conduits within Russia. Desisting from this demolition could serve as a negotiating instrument for peace.
Strategy 3. A preemptive, unexpected, and extensive offensive by Ukrainian armed forces against Russian armed forces proximate to the Russian border, situated on Russian territory. Ceasing the offensive could serve as a negotiating instrument for peace.
Strategy 4. Cultivate proficiency in prevailing in asymmetrical warfare. Relieve generals adept solely in traditional warfare, identify individuals cognizant of the aforementioned principles, and designate them as commanders. Commence waging asymmetrical warfare in an autocratic fashion.
Thus, we either metamorphose the asymmetrical conflict into a conventional war, or participate in asymmetrical warfare via authoritarian modalities. All such undertakings propel the conflict into the public domain, gradually eradicating the illusory reality within Russia. Such undertakings will authorize Ukraine to attain strategic precedence over Russia for the inaugural occasion. Absent such actions, we must brace for Ukraine’s defeat in a conflict with Russia.
The latent hazards inherent within such strategies entail that, should the world withhold its backing from us in these endeavors, the plausible introduction of a regular army into eastern Ukraine and/or Russia launching aerial bombardments upon Ukrainian cities.
Consequently, the options consist of either a humiliating peace, the structuring of authoritarian military command within an asymmetrical conflict, or the transition from asymmetrical warfare to a war between regular armies, coupled with the acceptance of mass casualties amid the civilian demographic.
Such matters should remain undisclosed. Nevertheless, I am deprived of avenues to transmit my vision to the decision-makers engaged in this conflict, save for publicly. I lack the means to persuade the Ukrainian government of its misconstrual of the strategy for a prospective peace.
We must come to terms with these disconcerting and rigorous realities; otherwise, the ramifications will prove even more severe.
Author of the material: Sergey Datsyuk
Based on materials from: Hvylya.org
