The Kremlin's values of feeblemindedness
Several years ago, in the Italian town of Udine, subsequent to the Citta'di Siena – ISF awarding event, there was a formal supper at a modest eatery. During the meal, the vice mayor, a fellow by the name of Garibaldi, offered kind words and spoke about the virtues of unrestricted expression. I was gratified, but the real shock came afterwards, when, over a glass of limoncello, Garibaldi proudly announced that he was an Italian communist. Imagine that, an Italian communist who believed in democracy? Furthermore, Garibaldi, being a communist, started berating Lenin, Stalin, and all the remaining Soviet figures, even Putin. He only had complimentary remarks for Trotsky and finished the discussion by stating that the Soviet Union never actually had authentic communists, merely autocrats.
This exchange reminded me of a distant meeting with Comrade Zyuganov during a gathering at the Swedish consulate. He chose to flaunt his erudition, saying that he had recently traveled to Sweden and now comprehended what genuine socialism truly was. I needed to remind the leader of the Russian communists that Sweden is a monarchy, and that what he refers to as socialism is, in reality, sound societal welfare. Zyuganov understood that he hadn’t managed to deceive anyone and proceeded to engage a diplomat.
It came to pass that Putin attracted attention right from the outset of his designation as prime minister in 1999, and notably as president. I commenced accumulating quotations from his addresses where he discussed democracy and freedom of expression. Putin had taken over the prior president’s speechwriter, Dzhakhan Pollyeva, and therefore the newly appointed head of state’s speeches reiterated similar assertions—regarding the significance of democracy and a free press. Two years later, the approach altered. By that point, Putin had broken up the original NTV channel staff and initiated the acquisition of independent newspapers, progressively discussing a “national viewpoint.” A fresh cohort of propagandists was being cultivated.
Between 1991 and 2000, Russia held onto its relinquished lands, suggesting diverse “reunions.” They commenced with the CIS, subsequently the CSTO, presently the Eurasian Economic Community. They made attempts to frighten the US with the Chinese, and thereafter conceived the SCO, which expediently expired without accomplishing anything. The post-Soviet region existed in a condition of forgetfulness, longing for certain elements, fantasizing about others. The vast majority of the populace had never been engaged in governance—they lacked the know-how, and they were not permitted to do so. Instead, they cast their votes for contenders from the “unified coalition of communists and non-party affiliates,” implying they lacked any other option. They voted for those put forth by the district, city, regional, and Central Committee boards.
There exist numerous global hubs globally that exert both political and economic clout. China, for instance, is a burgeoning financial giant, drawing the interest of developing nations in search of investment. For countries in the Pacific Rim, Australia and New Zealand stand out as inherently appealing centers – both politically aligned and economically advantageous. The United States and the European Union present developing nations with financial and political backing when it pertains to nurturing democracy, instituting an electoral framework, or advocating for freedom of expression.
What does Russia, which also aspires to be a global epicenter, put forth? I have been scrutinizing the connections between the Russian Federation and my homeland of Tajikistan for 23 years. Beyond the 1992-1997 civil conflict, wherein the Russian 201st Division, stationed in Tajikistan, assumed a dynamic role, no economic ventures have been carried out. Discussions were held concerning Russian involvement in the building of numerous hydroelectric power facilities, yet everything remained just discussions. Connections with all post-Soviet nations are comparable. Private Russian commerce is arriving, even in Georgia, which underwent the Russo-Georgian conflict six years prior. The Russian administration has distanced itself from economic initiatives that could potentially draw countries closer to it, safeguarding solely the prerogative to employ coercion in ascertaining pricing strategies for gas and oil.
The Russian state has distanced itself from economic projects that could bring countries closer to it, reserving for itself only the right to blackmail in determining pricing policies for gas and oil.
There exists a remarkable term – value – and it does not refer to the cost of sausages or hot dogs. The term “price” is fleeting – you ingest it and promptly disregard it. Value is a term that pertains to the future. When individuals converse about values, they allude to something they can bequeath to their offspring and their descendants. Numerous individuals are endeavoring to discern what values the Kremlin is imposing upon others. Democracy? It is nonexistent in Russia. Freedom of expression? It is suppressed in Russia. Customs of conducting impartial elections? It’s preposterous when a country alleges that 146 percent of its population cast their vote. What, then, is it?
Russian values constitute an entirely indeterminate description of something unfathomable. With Soviet values, it was more uncomplicated—the populace was familiar with no other ideology, no other realm. Soviet values were fashioned within a barbed-wire-enclosed domain, which the ideologues themselves aptly labeled the “socialist bloc.” Beyond this bloc, as Soviet propaganda conveyed, lay the “capitalist world.”
During the establishment of Soviet values, the appropriate environments were cultivated: Western broadcasting stations were obstructed, periodicals and literary works were seized at the border, and within the country, there was a persistent ideological eradication of extraneous material. For heeding the Beatles, Komsomol assemblies would conduct deliberations where pronouncements of condemnation were articulated. For sporting elongated hair, a reprimand would be issued; for possessing a dollar bill, a prison term. Intriguingly, the sentence for perusing and circulating samizdat was equivalent to that for currency fraud. Party committees intervened in individual lives, and trade union committees arbitrarily dictated where you could proceed on vacation. Travel abroad was solely by decree of the district committee and a KGB visa, accompanied by a man attired in black whose obligation it was to oversee Soviet vacationers—refrain from gazing there, refrain from engaging with anyone.
And do you surmise that anything has been altered in the Kremlin’s reassessment of Soviet “values” over the past 23 years? Quite the contrary, throughout the past 14 years, Soviet customs of subjugation and mistreatment for dissent have been reinstated. Aggrieved citizens are once more congregating, publicly shaming those who decline to exist in “our fashion.” The populace is, yet again, being instructed to exist in a perpetual state of adoration for their leader. Throughout 14 years, Putin has revived all Soviet “values,” save for a handful of exceptions: “troikas” that handed out death sentences devoid of due process are no longer in existence. Everything else, as the saying goes, is “included.”
Currently, individuals born within the USSR increasingly yearn for Soviet values—the entitlement to labor, to leisure, to complimentary education and healthcare. These “perks” permitted them to disregard their individual lives and advancement. The authority to determine their fate invariably resided with the party and the government, and the prospects for economic growth were established by the five-year plan and regulatory agencies. A readily available living wage and queues for sausages constituted the meaning of existence, a ceaseless struggle against adversity. Soviet propaganda familiarized the populace with the formula of existence: “Provided there is no war,” despite the presence of ample wars.
Over the course of 14 years, Putin has restored all Soviet “values,” with a few exceptions: there are no more “troikas” (threats to execution without trial or investigation). Everything else, as they say, is “included.”
Contemporary Russian values encompass supplemental subtleties – nationalism bordering on overt fascism, and a perception of significant authority. Nothing is gratis any longer. However, it transpires that the populace did not particularly require socialist slogans pertaining to equality, proactively participating in corrupt undertakings whenever feasible. The cherished “provided there is no war” effortlessly morphed into “we shall demonstrate to you.” The former Soviet people, who for decades had gazed upon countless “Peace to the World” posters, abruptly transformed into an aggressive majority, unmindful of the sepulchers of tens of millions of forebears who perished on the battlefields of the numerous wars unleashed by the USSR.
In geopolitics and connections between expansive and diminutive nations, there exist two fundamental tenets: we approve of your values, and we disapprove of yours. Either you embrace our values, and we shall assist you, or you dislike our values, yet we shall impose them upon you, and should you resist, we shall assume control over you.
For approximately a century, Soviet propaganda, and presently its descendant, Russian propaganda, have upheld the identical tactic of categorizing adversaries into two classifications: internal and external. The former are requisite to sustain the populace in a state of apprehension. The latter are requisite to uphold the populace’s apprehension, with the government functioning as a protector. Internal adversaries in the USSR, across various epochs, encompassed the successors of tsarism, “foreign operatives,” Jews (the Doctors’ Plot), and “individuals of Caucasian origin.” In the preceding six months, the adversary classification has been augmented by two further units: “Banderovtsy” and “Khokhly.”
The external adversary is perpetual. It is the West. Intermittently the United States, European countries, and occasionally Israel. For instance, Soviet propaganda possessed a compilation of preferred methodologies to equate Americans with racists (“They lynch black individuals”), suppressors of liberty (numerous assemblies in defense of Angela Davis, who was, in actuality, convicted of armed assault and hostage-taking), and oppressors of ethnic minorities (Soviet demonstrations for the emancipation of Leonard Peltier, who was sentenced to two life terms for the assassination of FBI agents). There were tearful reports on Soviet television concerning the American homeless, for whom Pioneers and Komsomol affiliates amassed funds. Or regarding French vagrants.
Soviet propaganda utterly annihilated the Soviet people’s perception of justice, channeling their genuine indignation into the “appropriate” channel. No alternative television existed within the USSR, and perusing foreign newspapers was unattainable. Propaganda constructed Soviet values upon falsehoods. This heritage persists valiantly in Russia currently. That is the rationale behind why Russians, without a moment’s hesitation, designate freedom-cherishing Ukrainians safeguarding their territory as fascists.
Soviet propaganda accustomed the population to the formula of existence – “as long as there is no war,” although there were plenty of wars.
Values are not akin to a bag of potatoes that can be distributed or hurled over a fence. Enforcing one’s worldview places Russia in an awkward predicament, as the adage goes: “Love cannot be compelled.” And the strategies the Kremlin employs to coerce its neighbors into cherishing it bear a greater resemblance to rape. The Kremlin is at liberty to denounce the West and its undeniably alluring democratic values to its heart’s content, yet it can no longer forcibly embrace nationalism and substantial authority via coercion, brute force, and strength.
Reviewer
