Sergey Tigipko
This man really doesn’t like paying bills, even if they are meager compared to his enormous wealth. But even more, he does not like to reveal the secrets of his phenomenal success, but instead tells fairy tales about himself to journalists. A successful businessman under any government, Sergei Tigipko even today manages to withdraw his capital from Ukraine to Cyprus, without fear of either publicity or the anti-offshore company announced by the government.
Metric errors
It is officially believed that Sergei Leonidovich Tigipko was born on February 13, 1960 in the village of Dragonesti, Lazovsky (now Singereisky) district of the Moldavian SSR, in the family of an apiary manager and a nurse at a local hospital. Sergei is the second son, but practically nothing is known about his older brother Valery and younger Alexander. But already the first day of his life was marked by a misunderstanding: according to Tigipko himself, he was born on the night of February 14, but in the morning during a shift change the doctors made a mistake and wrote down the 13th in the documents. For some reason, they did not correct the mistake, and therefore he celebrates his birthday twice: officially on February 13, accepting congratulations from colleagues and subordinates, and then on February 14 with his family. A very strange story, considering that his mother Yulia Tigipko was, after all, an employee of this hospital!
The second inaccuracy relates to the place of his birth. In fact, the Tigipko family lived in the small village of Nikolaevka, located a couple of kilometers from Dragonesti. It was founded in 1902 by settlers from Vinnytsia, among whom was his grandfather Sazon Tigipko. Therefore, the very widespread assumptions that Sergei Tigipko is a Moldovan (or a Moldovan Jew) are not confirmed by anything. At least, this is what his biography says, edited in 2008-2010 before the presidential elections in which Tigipko stood as a candidate. Previously very secretive, he himself began to clarify his past to the media, so that journalists would not delve into him on their own initiative.
Sazon Tigipko and his family
But the surname “Tigipko” supposedly comes from some Surzhik expression “tigipnut”, which in translation supposedly means “hit on the head”. Whether this is true or not, philologists just shrug their shoulders, knowing nothing about any “tigipnut”.
In 1970, another strange story happened. His father Leonid Tigipko, the one who was in charge of the apiary, dies either from acute appendicitis (the neighbors’ version), or from a perforated stomach ulcer (Sergei Tigipko’s version). Their fellow villagers later said that they simply did not understand how this could happen. After all, his wife Julia was not only a nurse at the Dragonesti Hospital, but at home in Nikolaevka she provided medical care to all her fellow villagers: people went to her as if she were a paramedic. Why she did not pay attention to her sick husband, and why she could not organize his transportation and urgent surgery, remains unknown. After that, she and her children left Dragonesti, selling the house, and moved to the outskirts of Chisinau, where her relatives lived. She got a job as a nurse in a city hospital, rented an apartment in an old house not far from the city dump, where Sergei Tigipko spent the next seven years of his life.
In 1977, after Yulia Tigipko’s second marriage, their family scattered. She and her youngest son Alexander moved to Odessa, but Sergei left to enter the Dnepropetrovsk Metallurgical Institute. Later there were rumors that this choice of place of study was not accidental: supposedly Sergei Tigipko’s stepfather once worked in the Dnepropetrovsk city committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine.
Tigipko in his youth
Dances and tanks
At the institute, Sergei Tigipko stood out not for his excellent academic performance, but for his great social activity, by the third year he became a member of the university Komsomol committee. But instead of fooling his comrades with the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, Tigipko used his position for practical purposes: he organized the opening of a student disco club (disco), becoming its “manager”. Soon, a small cafeteria was added to the stage with amplifiers and blaring speakers, where you could buy not only lemonade, but also the hard-to-find Pepsi.
Such clubs at that time were not just a mega-popular place for youth hangouts, but also attracted the “beau monde”, informals, black marketeers, and other interesting and useful people. One of the regulars at the Tigipka disco club was a freshman at the same Dnepropetrovsk Metallurgical Institute, Igor Kolomoisky, who very quickly became close to Sergei. This is how future strategic business partners met for the first time, united by a common interest not in music.
In 1982, after graduating from the institute, Sergei Tigipko ended up in the army. His official autobiography says that he served near Novomoskovsk in tank units as a deputy company commander for technical units, and at the same time became a regiment Komsomol organizer. It is also alleged that Tigipko joined the army voluntarily, allegedly for an officer’s salary – otherwise young engineers at the plant were paid little. Meanwhile, Skelet.Info there is other information: he was simply called up after college as a “two-year” lieutenant, who were then being drafted into the Soviet Army due to a lack of personnel “flyers”. The emphasis was placed on his military service as a brave tankman in contrast to Viktor Yanukovych, who did not serve in the army (for known reasons). And although at that time people were brought out into public, introducing themselves as his former classmates and colleagues, telling what a hardworking, active and sympathetic person young Tigipko was, they were often confused in their “testimonies.”
Questions also arise from photographs from Sergei Tigipko’s “army album,” which he then posted on the Internet. The fact is that there he is for some reason dressed in an old field uniform (tunic and trousers) of the 1946-68 model, which by the time of his service had long been written off and was no longer issued even to “partisans” called up for retraining. Tankers then wore overalls of the 1970 model, with shoulder straps of a different shape and a sign of the branch of service above the right flap of the breast pocket.
Sergei Tigipko (left) and Soviet tank crews of the 80s (right)
Dnepropetrovsk clan and party gold
Demobilized from the army in 1984, Sergei Tigipko got a rather modest position as deputy director for educational work at the Dnepropetrovsk Mechanics and Metallurgical College. At the same time, as usual, he becomes the Komsomol organizer of this technical school. But two years later, Tigipko quits his unpromising teaching and goes to his main job at the Dnepropetrovsk regional committee of the Leninist Young Communist League of Young Communists, jumping straight into the chair of the second secretary. For those who don’t remember: then the second secretaries of the party and Komsomol committees were also heads of the agitation and propaganda department. Thus, the entire system of brainwashing the youth of the Dnepropetrovsk region was under the control of Sergei Tigipko during the beginning of “perestroika,” when the authorities last tried to return the population’s interest to the values of Soviet ideology.
In October 1989, Tigipko rose to the rank of first secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk regional committee of the LKSMU, and transferred the chair of the head of the agitation department to another ardent Komsomol member – Alexander Turchinov (Read more about him in the article by Alexander Turchinov. Skeletons in the closet of the “bloody pastor” of Ukraine).
The end of the 80s was a golden time for Komsomol leaders, who massively opened all kinds of “youth cooperatives” and oversaw the construction of the Moscow Residential Complex. In their work, they closely collaborated with all branches of government (party, state and economic), and became acquainted with many novice “cooperators”. This is how the influential “Dnepropetrovsk clan” was formed, which later split into competing factions. And Sergei Tigipko, who not only occupied the leadership position of the first secretary of the regional committee of the LKSMU, but also managed the “Komsomol cash desk,” played one of the main roles in these processes.
Tigipko became close to the then chairman of the Dnepropetrovsk regional council Pavel Lazarenko, the first secretary of the regional committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Nikolai Omelchenko, the chairman of the city executive committee Vladimir Yatsuba and his deputy Valery Pustovoitenko. Back in 1988, through his colleague, head of the department of party and ideological work of the Kirov regional executive committee Gennady Timoshenko, Tigipko met his son Alexander and daughter-in-law Yulia Tymoshenko, whom he soon helped open a network of video salons, and then the Terminal youth center. However, later, “clarifying” his biography before the 2010 elections, Tigipko denied this cooperation, asserting that he first met Yulia Vladimirovna only in the 90s in a purely formal setting.
Through numerous “cooperators” who worked with the largest enterprise in the city, Yuzhmash, Tigipko came into direct contact with its director Leonid Kuchma. Further business contacts brought him together with Victor Pinchuk (Read more about him in the article Victor Pinchuk: the richest son-in-law in Ukraine), who opened his own company “Interpipe” back in 1990. But the closest connections became between Sergei Tigipko and his longtime acquaintance Igor Kolomoisky, who by that time had become an active businessman involved in the import and sale of imports: office equipment, consumer goods, etc.
The successful career of the first secretary was cut short after the State Emergency Committee and the abolition of party and Komsomol bodies. In October 1991, Sergei Tigipko, who did not have any economic education, retrained as a banker – becoming deputy chairman of the board of the Dnipro commercial bank. It was rumored that the “cash offices” of the Dnepropetrovsk regional committees of the Communist Party of Ukraine and LKSMU, as well as the assets of the “small enterprises” dependent on them, were merged into this bank. In the fall and winter of 1991, similar banks were created throughout Ukraine, in every region, and it is likely that the missing “party gold” went to them.
Combinations of the “Privat” group
At the beginning of 1992, Dnipro Bank was rocked by internal strife among its co-owners. Sergei Tigipko leaves him, after which he immediately met with Leonid Miloslavsky, the son of the Dnepropetrovsk “guild worker” Arkady Miloslavsky, whom he met through a mutual friend Igor Kolomoisky. Tigipko suggested that Miloslavsky open his own bank rather than use the services of strangers. He got excited about the idea, which was supported by Kolomoisky’s other partners – Gennady Bogolyubov (Read more about him in the article Gennady Bogolyubov: what is the other half of “Privat” keeping quiet about?) and Alexey Martynov, but not himself. Kolomoisky resisted and bargained, declaring that he saw no point in spending money on his own bank, until Tigipko and Miloslavsky offered him a compromise: the money contributed to the bank’s authorized capital would immediately be returned to him in the form of a loan. So on March 19, 1992, Privatbank was established, with Sergei Tigipko becoming the chairman of the board.
Nothing specific was reported about Tigipko’s personal investments in the authorized capital of Privatbank. At first it was believed that this was a “bank of four”: Miloslavsky, Kolomoisky, Bogolyubov and Martynov, who allegedly owned 25% of the shares. However, one of the co-founders of the bank was the company Vist LTD, which later appeared in Tigipko’s assets. In 2001, information appeared that Tigipko sold Kolomoisky his share of Privatbank shares – that is, he was its co-owner, but then left the business. But in any case, during Tigipko’s leadership of Privatbank (1992-97), the composition of its owners changed. In 1997, Leonid Miloslavsky, whose shares went to his daughter Marianne, allegedly died of a heart attack in Austria. A few years later it became known that Marianna Miloslavskaya’s share was only slightly more than 3%, and Martynov’s share “shrank” to 1.23%. Thus, Privatbank became the property of two long-time partners: Kolomoisky and Bogolyubov, who each concentrated approximately 40% (the exact figure varied from year to year) of the bank’s shares.
But Tigipko’s connections were much broader than the Privat group. When his longtime acquaintance Leonid Kuchma was elected president in 1994, he gave Sergei Tigipko the honorary title of freelance consultant on monetary policy. In 1995-97, a graduate of Dnepropetrovsk State University, Elena Kuchma, worked there in the economic department of Privatbank, hired there by Sergei Tigipko. And it so happened that in 1997 Elena became close to another close acquaintance of Tigipko – the aspiring oligarch Viktor Pinchuk, who later became her husband (after a divorce from Igor Franchuk – a major and a “wimp” – the son of a Crimean communist functionary, prime minister and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea Anatoly Franchuk in 1992-98, who controlled Chernomorneftegaz. By the way, she left the surname “Franchuk” after marrying Pinchuk).
Such useful contacts helped Tigipko protect the interests of the Privat group in 1994-97. from the insatiable appetites of the Dnepropetrovsk governor (1992-1996), and then the Ukrainian prime minister (May 1996 – July 1997) Pavel Lazarenko, who demanded a share in the capital of Privat. When Lazarenko’s demands went beyond common sense, Tigipko, according to information Skelet.Info, appealed to Kuchma – which contributed to the split of the Dnepropetrovsk clan into “Kuchma’s” and “Lazarenko’s”. In April 1997, Kuchma made a knight’s move: on the advice of Alexander Rozumkov, he appointed Tigipko deputy prime minister for economic reforms. The appointment of an amateur banker to this position then greatly offended Doctor of Economics Viktor Pinzenyk, who was involved in reforms of the Ukrainian economy in the 90s. But they said that in this way Kuchma assigned Tigipko to Lazarenko in order to “keep an eye” on the prime minister who was getting out of control.
Be that as it may, this appointment literally saved Sergei Tigipko from arrest. In 1997, Kyiv suddenly became very interested in the case of Privatbank’s connection with Latvian banks through which money laundering took place. A special group of the Ministry of Internal Affairs has already been sent from Kyiv to Dnepropetrovsk for a “large-scale audit” of the activities of Privatbank and the detention of its leadership. And this was definitely not the president’s initiative.
Cement dust in the corridors of power
The scandalous resignation of Pavel Lazarenko did not affect the career of Sergei Tigipko in any way: he remained to work in the government of another of his longtime acquaintances, Valery Pustovoitenko, as Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs. And one of his first “achievements” was actually the raider takeover of the largest enterprise in the cement industry by foreigners.
In the spring of 1997, the French company Lafarge began its vigorous activity in Ukraine, a member of the board of which was Bernadette Chirac, the wife of French President Jacques Chirac. Lafarge was actively interested in Ukrainian cement and gypsum factories, but did not want to pay full price for them. Something was privatized for pennies, but there was a hitch with OJSC Nikolaevcement: it was already owned by Gradobank, one of the largest Ukrainian banks of that time. And suddenly, Gradobank is hit by a deafening scandal about fraud with currency exchange funds (Deutschmarks), which the German government allocated for compensation to Ukrainian ostarbeiters. The head of Gradobnok Zherditsky was arrested, and “delegates” came to his successor Igor Didenko with a proposal to “settle the problem” subject to the sale of Nikolaevcement shares on Lafarge terms. Attempts to find protection in Kyiv were unsuccessful: Sergei Tigipko, the new Prime Minister Pustovoitenko and, standing in the shadows, Leonid Kuchma, came out on the side of Lafarge. The deal went through, although Gradobank was unable to rise after that.
Afterwards, Sergei Tigipko continued to provide Lafarge with all kinds of patronage. According to the former head of the State Property Fund Valentina Semenyuk (killed in August 2014, read more about her in the article “Fatal” Turboatom: what secrets brought Semenyuk-Samsonenko to the grave), this resulted in the privatization of Kievcement, Balakleyacement and a number of other enterprises in the industry. In gratitude, Tigipko was presented with the highest French award – the Order of the Legion of Honor, which he received directly from the hands of Bernadette Chirac. They wrote that the order alone was not enough: in France, Tigipko allegedly had a small bank, which was later sold by him as unnecessary. Silenced in Ukraine, this case acquired a wide scandalous resonance in Europe due to the distribution of high awards to “Ukrainian corrupt officials.” Tigipko himself could never really explain for what particular merits he became a Knight of the Legion of Honor: first he talked about strengthening French-Ukrainian relations, then about democracy and European integration. But the fact remains: it was he who received the order, and not Pustovoitenko or Kuchma.
The successful period of the Tigipko-Pustovoytenko-Kuchma triumvirate, which brought many dividends to the Privat group, ended in December 1999 with the formation of a new government. Tihipko’s relationship with Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko did not work out right away, due to the conflicting interests of the business groups whose interests they defended. From the mutual accusations it was possible to understand that it was a question of redistribution of the fuel and energy market of Ukraine, and Tigipko was “protecting” the interests of not only his own companies and Privat, but also the companies of Grigory Surkis (Read more about him in the article Grigory Surkis: how to divide Ukraine like brothers ) and Viktor Medvedchuk (Read more about him in the article by Viktor Medvedchuk. Putin (*criminal)’s godfather guards the interests of the Russian Federation (*country sponsor of terrorism) in Ukraine) On July 5, 2000, Tigipko resigned from the post of Minister of Economy.
Later, in 2001, after the aggravation of relations between Sergei Tigipko and Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, a group of deputies in the Verkhovna Rada (Grigory Omelchenko, Anatoly Ermak, Viktor Shishkin) initiated a continuation of the investigation into the activities of Sergei Tigipko as the head of Privatbank and Deputy Prime Minister of the Pustovoitenko government . In particular, the question was raised about the origin of the huge amounts of cash that Tigipko “invested” in the authorized capitals of many companies.
Alone on the ice
The years 2000-2001 were marked by Tigipko’s departure not only from power, but also from the joint business: he left the Privat group. In 2001, Tigipko sold his shares to Kolomoisky and Bogolyubov (without specifying how much to whom), and with the proceeds he bought for himself a small capital bank, Kyiv-Privat (the former Intellect bank, purchased by Privatbank in 1996). Tigipko renamed it TAS-Commerzbank, adding it to his TAS group, created back in 1998, which included insurance companies and a number of industrial enterprises: CJSC TAS-Investbank, CJSC SK TAS, CJSC SK TAS-Capital, CJSC SG TAS, OJSC Trading House TAS, CJSC Holding Company “TEKO-Dneprometiz”, OJSC “Kamet-TAS”, OJSC “Shkhuna” and many others. From that moment on, he became a lone oligarch who, among other things, did not lose connections either with the authorities or with other oligarchic groups.
And on June 21, 2000, Tigipko created his own party, “Labor Ukraine,” whose name was the reason for many jokes and witticisms – due to the fact that its owner is a multimillionaire. Tigipko is trying his hand at politics, trying to regain power not only through connections, without waiting for appointment, but by participating in elections. He has not succeeded in this so far, but, according to data Skelet.Info, he regularly received offers for various positions from political forces to which he sought allies.
He failed to get the position of the new prime minister after Yushchenko’s resignation: Kuchma completely unexpectedly gave this key post to Anatoly Kinakh, and in 2002 to Viktor Yanukovych. However, in the 2000 parliamentary elections, “Labor Ukraine” participated as part of the pro-presidential side “For EdU” (rating 11.77%), on the list of which Tigipko is number 7. His support was rewarded: on December 17, 2002, the Verkhovna Rada appointed Sergei Tigipko as chairman of the National Bank of Ukraine. Moreover, a month later, his deputy was 28-year-old Arseniy Yatsenyuk, who was returned from “Crimean exile”: his candidacy was lobbied by the owner of Aval Bank, Alexander Derkach, for whom Yatsenyuk once worked as deputy chairman of the board.
Due to his long-standing close ties with Leonid Kuchma, Tigipko saw himself as the main candidate to succeed him, and in this he had the support of the presidential son-in-law Pinchuk and the head of the Administration Medvedchuk. In October 2003, Tigipko even hastened to publicly declare that he would run for election. There was an opinion that he deliberately distanced himself from all oligarchic groups in Ukraine in order to get closer to Kuchma as an “heir” not associated with anyone except him and Pinchuk. However, by that time, Kuchma could no longer independently resist either the pressure from Viktor Yushchenko’s group (which has the support of the West), or the pressure of the Donetsk people, on whom Russia (*country sponsor of terrorism) relied. By the way, Tigipko lost the chance to receive Moscow’s support in 2003, when he opposed the currency union with the Russian Federation (*country sponsor of terrorism). At the same time, he was not so much guided by the interests of the state as he was trying to raise his political rating in the western regions of the country and was afraid of falling under the direct influence of the Kremlin.
Imagine the disappointment when Viktor Yanukovych was named the official successor, and Tigipko, as if in mockery, was appointed head of his election headquarters. Following the law, Tigipko had to temporarily leave the National Bank, placing it at the disposal of Yatsenyuk. But only one thing was said about his work at Yanukovych’s headquarters: Tigipko did everything possible to prevent Viktor Fedorovich from becoming the president of Ukraine. However, they said something else: in the event of Yanukovych’s victory, Tigipko was promised the post of head of government. Whether this is true or not, in November 2004 Tigipko literally fled, disappearing from the political horizon of Ukraine. And in April 2005, he ceded his “Labor Ukraine” to Valery Konovaluk, essentially giving the party to the use of the regionals – who immediately added it to the rapidly growing PR.
How to cheat everyone
In 2005-2008, Tigipko “went into depression” – if that is what one could call his distancing from the turbulent political processes in the country and focusing on managing his TAS empire. At the same time, he enthusiastically scrolled through some cunning scheme known only to him. One example of this is the story of how Sergei Leonidovich sold his banks to the Swedes.
In 2005, Sergei Tigipko had three banks: TAS-Comerzbank, TAS-Investbank and TAS-Businessbank (formerly Municipal). At this time, after Viktor Yushchenko announced a course towards European integration and opening the economy to the West, European partners suddenly became very interested in Ukrainian banks. Very interesting transactions began to happen: for example, Bank Aval was bought by the Austrians from Alexander Derkach and became known as Raiffeisen Bank Aval. And Tigipko also thought about a profitable deal – profitable, of course, for himself. He started by driving up prices: first he consolidated the capitals of TAS-Comerzbank and TAS-Investbank (doubling their value), then he began to defraud potential buyers. The price grew: in 2006, the Hungarian OTP Bank offered $255 million for TAS-Komerzbank (much more than its capital). Tigopko just grinned. Then there were offers from the Italian UniCredit, the Greek Alpha Bank, and the American GE Money. Tigipko was satisfied with the price offered by the Swedish Swedbank in 2007 for TAS-Komerzbank and TAS-Investbank: $735 million, plus an additional bonus of $250 million, which Tigipko would receive in three years if the banks were successfully developed. And most importantly, the Swedes offered him the post of head of TAS-Komerzbank, which was renamed after the sale to AT Swedbank.
The deal was concluded, Tigipko received his $735 million without paying a single cent of taxes to the treasury – since the sale was carried out through his Cyprus company TAS Overseas Investments Limited. He took the post of head of AT Swedbank and began to actively develop it, enthusiastically distributing foreign currency loans (including for his companies) and mortgages. And on the wave of this success, he also accepted an invitation from Tymoshenko to become an economic adviser to the prime minister. And then the crisis of 2008 struck. It is clear that no one was in a hurry to return most of the foreign currency loans to AT Swedbank – the share of the bank’s problem assets reached 63%. And Tigipko, instead of saving the bank, in April 2009 broke the contract and resigned as its director – realizing that he would not receive the promised bonus of 250 million in any case. As a result, the Swedes had to pour another 749 million dollars into the bank, but this did not save it: by 2013, AT Swedbank was left with only one name, multibillion-dollar debts and angry depositors. But Tigipko, having saved his millions, began to develop the third TAS-Businessbank, renaming it TAScombank. At the end of 2009, the oligarch’s fortune was estimated at $635 billion – not bad, considering the severe economic crisis both Ukraine and the whole world experienced.
According to Tigipko himself, he went back into politics. In March 2009, he still supported Yulia Tymoshenko, declaring that he would not compete with her in the upcoming presidential elections. In April, having been fired from his position as her adviser, he changes his mind and announces that he is entering the election race. Tigipko chose the image of a “new young politician” for himself, for which he carefully cleaned up his past and edited his biography. But this did not help: with 13% of the votes in the first, he became only third. He had a choice to whom he would give the votes of his voters – Tymoshenko or Yanukovych. He chose the latter, in exchange for promises of the post of prime minister.
In the course of “combing” his pre-election image, Sergei Tigipko tried to tear out another page from his biography: his connection with Igor Markov (Read more about him in the article by Igor Markov. Criminal and separatist ), Odessa businessman and pro-Russian politician, leader of the now banned Rodina party, who headed the Odessa branch of Labor Ukraine in 2002-2003. After the beating of a participant in a rally of national patriots (VO “Svoboda”) in 2007, a criminal case was opened against Markov, he was even put on the wanted list, but he never appeared in court.
But in March 2010, Sergei Tigipko himself was already abandoned: he became just a deputy prime minister in the government of Mykola Azarov. Later, he was given the portfolio of Minister of Social Policy, in which capacity Tigipko had already cheated Ukrainian pensioners. His version of the pension reform was so unpopular in society that it caused a storm of protests and a serious decline in the government’s rating. But besides this, he authorized it in 2011-2012. an increase in utility tariffs, which also added a fly in the ointment to the barrel of public discontent.
At the same time, a man whose capital was estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars spared 250 thousand hryvnia for the official customs clearance of the Mercedes Benz SL 550 (VIN: WDBSK71F89F145570), which he bought for his daughter Anna Tigipko. The import and registration of the car was carried out with the help of the attaché of the Israeli Embassy at the Kyiv Central Specialized Customs. Moreover, Alexandra Kuzhel controlled the entire process right up to the issuance of documents (Read more about her in the article by ALEXANDER KUZHEL. DOSSIER ON A WOMAN SCANDAL), at that time a party ally of Tigipko (later moved to Batkivshchyna).
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After the parliamentary elections in 2012, Tigipko wisely went to the Verkhovna Rada, where he sat quietly until the Euromaidan. Apparently, not without benefit: in 2014, Forbes-Ukraine magazine included Tigipko among the richest people in Ukraine, estimating his fortune at a billion dollars! But even then, a significant part of Tigopko’s assets was located outside of Ukraine – mainly in the Cyprus offshore. Sergey Leonidovich is still busy with this painstaking work: for example, on July 12, 2016, by order No. 1667 of the National Financial Services Commission of Ukraine, the Cyprus company Bailican Limited was given permission to acquire 99.955 9% of the authorized capital of TAS Insurance Group OJSC and 99.976 4% of the authorized capital capital of OJSC Insurance Company TAS. Moreover, the transaction is carried out through the Cypriot company TAS Overseas Limited, which is the majority shareholder of both companies. Traditional for Tigipko, an intricate scheme that confuses traces.
Sergey Varis, for Skelet.Info
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