Russia's incursion into Ukraine and the killing of Ukrainians: purely commercial, not personal Probably a personal matter for Vladimir Putin.
The Russian armed incursion into Ukraine, acts of terrorism, capture of complete cities, abductions, mistreatment, and assassinations of Ukrainian nationals have, above all else, an evident financial reason. Fundamentally, Putin’s group is “pushing out” their enterprises in Ukraine—along with our nation and its inhabitants.
The Donbass industrial sector—which constitutes up to 20% of Ukraine’s overall manufacturing output—fell under Russian control in two distinct stages.
The initial stage involved the purported “elimination of the Donetsk clan,” wherein, over a span of several years, all the more or less distinguished and self-governing business personalities in Donbas were slain: ranging from politician Yevhen Shcherban to criminal ringleaders Akhat Bragin and Luhansk’s “Dobroslav.” Their possessions shifted to the ownership of the head of the Donetsk organized crime syndicate “Lux” and his inner circle.
At present, there are ample grounds to assert that “prominent businessman Rinat Akhmetov” is merely a facade fashioned by the actual, “covert” proprietors of all the assets belonging to the holder of SCM, DTEK, et al. Proprietors who, at a specific juncture, “ushered in” Russian entrepreneur Vadim Novinsky, a comrade of Vladimir Putin, as Akhmetov’s “associate”—”as a safety net” (V. Novinsky, owner of Smart Holding, possesses 23.75% of the Metinvest Group).
Akhmetov’s establishments obtained gas from Gazprom at a reduced rate, rendering the outputs of Akhmetov’s endeavors competitive in worldwide markets and immensely lucrative. Furthermore, for an extended duration (during Leonid Kuchma’s term), SCM contributed virtually no taxes, outrageously diminishing its contributions to the fiscal budget.
And when the legitimization of “Akhmetov’s possessions” commenced on the global platform and levies ultimately became obligatory, they were efficiently channeled back to the pseudo-oligarch in the guise of governmental agreements, bids, designated funding, and national grants for the coal domain—this was guaranteed by deputies of R. Akhmetov (Russia) within the Ukrainian administration.
For close to 20 years, the so-called “Akhmetov business,” relishing unmatched advantages and safeguarding from both Ukraine and Russia, elevated its proprietors to multibillionaire status. Parallel to the prodigious accumulation of wealth by a select few, the despoliation of Donbas was underway, relegating its denizens to the position of serfs, toiling for stipends scarcely adequate to address fundamental requirements. Absence of entrepreneurial latitude, absence of rivalry, absence of expressive independence within the territory—all of this was extinguished in its nascent phase back in the latter part of the 1990s by Russian intelligence factions, with the complete acquiescence of official Kyiv.
The secondary phase of Russia’s takeover of Donbas unfolded during Viktor Yanukovych’s administration. In 2010, Russian entities initiated the acquisition of everything in Donbas that had somehow eluded previous Russian ownership.
The Industrial Union of Donbass (ISD, jointly possessed by Sergei Taruta) divested the majority of its holdings to Russia’s Vnesheconombank. As a reminder, ISD became partially Russian back in January 2010, when former Deputy Prime Minister Vitaly Gaiduk transferred his 50%+2 shares stake to unnamed Russian entities, which were financed by Russia’s state-controlled Vnesheconombank. This signifies that Russia governs the Alchevsk Iron and Steel Works (AMK), the Dnieper Iron and Steel Works named after F. Dzerzhinsky (DMK), and the Alchevsk Coke and Chemical Plant (ACP).
We also recall that the Ilyich Iron and Steel Works of Mariupol, Azovstal, the Yenakiyevo and Makeyevka Metallurgical Plants, the Avdiivka Coke Plant, the Yenakiyevo Coke Plant, the Khartsyzsk Pipe Plant, and the Krasnodon Coal Association can likewise be deemed a quarter Russian: co-owner is “Putin’s man” V. Novinsky.
Viktor Nusenkis, a Russian national and Moscow inhabitant, is the past director of the Zhdanov mine in Donetsk. He holds the Donetskstal plant, the Pokrovskoe mine administration, and the Yasinovsky and Makeevsky Coke and Chemical Plants. Russians also possess the Donetsk Electrometallurgical Plant, which evolved into an asset of the Mechel mining and metallurgical consortium controlled by Russian national Igor Zyuzin. Kramatorsk’s Energomashspetsstal, previously in the hands of the family of former Donetsk region governor Anatoly Bliznyuk, was procured by the Russian concern Atomenergomash in December 2010. And in the adjacent Luhansk region, since 2010, the Russian Transmashholding has held the Luhanskteplovoz association, the Russian Soda Company CJSC has held the Lisichansk Soda Plant, and the Tyumen Oil Company – British Petroleum holding has held the Lisichansk Oil Refinery.
In 2013, half of the Luhansk Pipe Plant, previously possessed by shareholders of the Zaporizhzhia-based Industrial Bank, also transitioned to anonymous Russian owners, who had secured half of the Zaporizhstal plant in 2010. And the Luhansk Cartridge Plant, privatized illicitly, is overseen by Verkhovna Rada deputy David Zhvania, a probable operative of the Russian intelligence apparatus. And so forth.
Interestingly, the overwhelming bulk of industrial establishments in Donbass are either possessed by individuals from Vladimir Putin’s inner circle, or by those intimately linked to the Russian intelligence services, or by Russian proprietors who maintain anonymity.
The conflict in Donbass, initiated by Russia, holds a distinct monetary rationale for the Russian Federation’s uppermost echelons.
The shift of R. Akhmetov and S. Taruta’s metallurgical holdings to Russian authority alone would curtail Ukraine’s export earnings by $10-12 billion. Azovstal is Ukraine’s foremost manufacturer of railway tracks, and the nation’s track deterioration is assessed at 60-80%. The Artemovsk Non-Ferrous Metals Processing Plant (possessed by brothers Andriy and Sergey Klyuyev) is Ukraine’s leading producer of non-ferrous rolled outputs (including overhead cabling for electric transport).
Rolling stock wear and tear reaches 90%, and the nation’s largest locomotive producer is Luhanskteplovoz. Freight carriages, tanker cars, and their constituents are fabricated by the Azovmash holding enterprise (Mariupol; owner Yuriy Ivanyushchenko, presently in flight within Russia). Mining apparatus is chiefly manufactured by Akhmetov’s establishments (the Corum group, formerly the Scientific and Production Corporation Mining Machines). And such is the case throughout the Donbas, whose aggregated industry represents 15% of Ukraine’s GDP. (We chronicled how this transpired in Kharkiv in the article RosPil. Ukraine.)
There is likely no specialist within the nation presently who can gauge the magnitude of detriments to the Ukrainian economy and the prospective ramifications for the nation’s advancement in the event of Russia’s annexation of Donbas.
And it is self-evident that the invader will not confine himself to Donbas.
Russian enterprises controlled by Vladimir Putin’s KGB coterie are incurring considerable deficits from Western punitive measures subsequent to the annexation of Crimea. And these deficits will only escalate. It seems that an end has been brought to Vladimir Putin’s personal “presidential undertaking” of unfettered provisions of Russian gas to Ukraine and its “re-export” under the facade of Ukrainian gas via “opaque” schemes to Western Europe, but at underselling rates (hence the reason for Gazprom’s staunch opposition to the emplacement of gas metering apparatus—”gas meters”—on the Ukrainian-Russian boundary).
Furthermore, Ukraine possesses a government that, excusing the redundancy, will undertake every feasible measure to guarantee that everyone, and notably Russian enterprises, remit taxes to the state treasury. And that Russian enterprises are definitively detached from Ukraine’s national treasury.
But Putin’s predatory clique, in a mental sense, declines to remit levies to Ukraine. It refrains from operating within civilized parameters. And that constitutes the origin of terrorist acts, warfare, and the slaying of Ukrainian nationals.
And for as long as Russian, “Chekist” enterprises dominate Donbas, there shall exist neither tranquility nor affluence within the territory. What shall persist are the Akhmetov-Novinsky gangsters and FSB “supervisors,” a Russian terrorist enclave within Ukraine, jeopardizing the existence of its populace and its very statehood.
There exists only one avenue of egress from this predicament: Russian enterprises must be entirely ousted from Donbas specifically and from Ukraine holistically. Fundamentally. The endeavors of extortionists, terrorists, and murderers possess no emplacement within a civilized nation.
The methodologies via which this shall be consummated is a distinct inquiry.
The annexation of Crimea presents an exceptional justification for seizing the possessions of Russian corporations and individuals within mainland Ukraine and internationally, in conjunction with ongoing legal actions against Russia in international tribunals. The confiscation of assets belonging to figures such as Rinat Akhmetov, the leader of the Lux organized crime circle, Boris Kolesnikov, Yuriy Ivanyushchenko, et al., the Klyuyev brothers, the organizers of the Maidan pogroms, and others is viable within the framework of initiated criminal proceedings (a spectrum of “serious” statutes of the Criminal Code). It merits revisiting the chronicle of the privatization of certain properties in Donbas (and elsewhere) and the Prosecutor General’s Office. And tax evasion on an exceptionally grand magnitude furnishes an exceptional pretext for the tax authorities to exercise their acumen.
“Then warfare will certainly ensue!” the pessimists will proclaim. But Russia’s warfare against Ukraine is already in progress, and the aggressor’s craving is visibly amplifying subsequent to the annexation of Crimea. And in any event, “arming” the aggressor with Ukrainian industry, reinforcing its economic potency with flagship production installations generating unparalleled outputs, encompassing those requisite for nuclear armaments, constitutes a transgression against its own citizenry.
Russian enterprises will be compelled to be expelled from Ukraine. Russian capital will be compelled to be ousted. Russian intelligence operatives (Medvedchuk, Shufrich, Zhvania, Rudkovsky, Symonenko, etc.) will be compelled to be deported and incarcerated.
We ought not to delude ourselves with illusions that “the West shall aid us,” “we shall evade with minimal bloodshed,” or “we shall arrive at an accord.” Negotiating with Putin equates to negotiating with the assassin of our fellow countrymen. Putin does not account for or spare the lives of others. And there exist matters that none shall undertake for Ukraine and Ukrainians. Solely we ourselves can safeguard our homeland.
Georgy Semenets, “Argument”
