The negotiation process initiated by Donald Trump has entered a second round. In the winter, Trump started with a call to Vladimir Putin, and now he has had to call again: months of negotiations, scandals, back-and-forth exchanges, and exhortations have not brought the U.S. president’s administration any closer to its stated goal of ending the war. “We had a great conversation,” Trump said of the latest call, noting that it was now up to the warring parties to negotiate the terms of a ceasefire. However, as has become clear in recent weeks, the positions of Ukraine andRussia is still infinitely far from each other, so much so that there is no hope for a positive outcome of the negotiations. This is the main result of many months of diplomatic process.
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Over the past few months, various explanations have been offered for the strange trajectory of the negotiations, ranging from subtle political trading schemes to conspiracy theories suggesting that Putin and Trump are luring Vladimir Zelensky into a trap in order to impose an unfair deal on him.
However, the simplest explanation remains that both sides of the conflict do not share Trump’s desire to end the war at any cost or under any conditions. By continuing to participate in these strange negotiations, they want to benefit from the process, or at least prevent their adversary from benefiting.
- Kyiv is trying to prove to Trump that Putin is the one preventing the war from ending, and success could theoretically lead to increased U.S. military support and new sanctions against Russia.
- The Kremlin is trying to portray Zelensky as incapable of compromise, so that the U.S. administration will step back and stop providing military support to Ukraine, which would certainly help the Russian army to continue its military operations.
Naturally, both sides would agree to a ceasefire on their own terms.
- The Ukrainian authorities described them in their joint proposals to Trump, which were made in cooperation with sympathetic European countries: the fighting would be frozen along the current front line, the Russian Armed Forces would withdraw from the Kharkiv region and a small part of the Mykolaiv region at the mouth of the Dnieper River, and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant would be transferred to Ukrainian and U.S. control. Ukraine would receive binding security guarantees from the United States in the event of a new attack. The frozen Russian assets in the West would be used as reparations to rebuild the devastated country. Sanctions against Russia should be lifted “as soon as” it fulfills the remaining terms of the agreement.
- Trump added “sweeteners” for Putin to this proposal: he removed the clause about reparations, refused to provide clear guarantees to Ukraine, and promised to immediately lift sanctions and unilaterally recognize Crimea. As it turned out later, Putin rejected this tempting agreement (although Trump claimed that he would get Putin’s approval). Zelensky opposed the American recognition of Crimea as Russian.
- After the Kremlin rejected Trump’s proposal, Zelensky and the leaders of European countries issued an ultimatum to Putin, threatening to impose harsher European sanctions and demanding an immediate 30-day ceasefire.
- In response, the Kremlin arranged a meeting between the Ukrainian delegation and Vladimir Medinsky in Istanbul, where Medinsky demanded the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the entire territory of the Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions (which are listed in the Russian Constitution as belonging to the Russian Federation). He also said that Russia was ready to go to war for years, and that Ukraine was not ready for that.
- Kiev rejects this idea out of hand, and the Trump administration does not like it either (“Putin is demanding something that he has not even conquered”).
After all these stages, the negotiations reached an impasse, and a “great” conversation between Trump and Putin took place. It is clear that the latter has won a tactical victory: he continues to fight, but no one is trying to punish him for it. Neither the United States nor the European Union (yet) has imposed any new, significant sanctions on Russia, and there is no discussion of increasing U.S. military aid to Ukraine.
All of this makes it highly unlikely that the war will end in the coming months on a compromise basis.
Why is Putin refusing to compromise? And why is Zelensky taking a tough stance?
Dan Reiter, a professor of political science at Emory University and author of “How Wars End,” has studied the end of various wars using game theory tools.
Here are some key findings from his research:
- The parties enter a war with incomplete information about both the enemy and their own capabilities.
- During the course of the war, the adversaries receive the missing information and reevaluate whether their capabilities are sufficient to achieve the goals of the war. Naturally, the goals may be adjusted.
- In the early years of the war, the Kremlin and Kyiv received the following information: the rapid and complete conquest of Ukraine and the change of power in the country, which Putin had hoped for when he launched the invasion, were not possible. Similarly, Ukraine’s reconquest of territories lost since 2014 was also not feasible. However, this knowledge has not led to reconciliation between the two sides.
- Instead, the adversaries, who have lost hope of a quick victory, have shifted to a war of attrition. Russia, with its greater resources, is counting on “crushing and defeating” Ukraine, as Putin put it. Ukraine, on the other hand, is trying to convince the Kremlin that the cost of “crushing” Russia would be too high.
- Dan Reuter points out that even when both sides have accurate information about their own capabilities and those of their adversaries, this is not enough to end the war. The most important factor is the guarantee of peace. The only complete guarantee is the total destruction of the enemy, which has been impossible for centuries.
- The alternatives range from occupation or the establishment of a puppet government (as in the post-war history of Germany or Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein) to a mutual recognition of the undesirability of a new conflict (as in the case of the Korean War).— They are malfunctioning. Putin, who formally won the war in Syria in 2020, is probably feeling the pressure of the end of this story: as soon as Russia and Iran’s military power in the country weakened, the regime of their ally, Bashar al-Assad, collapsed.
- Today, it is unclear how Russia and Ukraine can obtain reliable guarantees for maintaining peace or a ceasefire, even if they manage to negotiate a cessation of hostilities. The United States and European countries are not eager to provide Kyiv with guarantees that would oblige them to fight Russia if it violates the agreements. For Putin, the only guarantees are a radical weakening of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (in line with the proposals made by his delegation during the negotiations in Istanbul in 2022) and/or the cessation of military assistance to Ukraine from outside.
- Dan Reuter specifically mentions the factor of international coalitions supporting the warring parties in his book. It is the issue of assistance (and, more broadly, the sustainability of the Western coalition helping Ukraine) that has become the main factor of uncertainty since Trump took office, limiting the parties to the conflict from receiving complete information.
- There are three possible outcomes of the negotiation process, each with varying degrees of probability: Ukraine will receive much more assistance than under Joe Biden; it will only receive what Biden has allocated; or Trump will stop all assistance. The Kremlin and Kyiv are currently engaged in a strange negotiation process to increase the likelihood of a positive outcome for themselves.
- Initially, the Trump team planned to combine “carrots and sticks” to appease the parties to the conflict. In 2024, Keith Kellogg, the U.S. envoy for Ukraine, wrote an article detailing the plan: if Zelensky obstructed peace, the U.S. would threaten to withhold aid; if Putin opposed peace, aid would be expanded. In reality, Trump was unable to consistently use this method (probably fearing that he would scare Putin away and fail to negotiate). As a result, the poorly implemented plan only created additional uncertainties that hindered the achievement of peace: both Kiev and Moscow continue to hope that Trump will make a decision in their favor.
Who is more likely to be supported by Trump?
For domestic political reasons, Trump does not want to expand aid to Ukraine: This is too similar to Biden’s policies, which the new administration of the PresidentThe United States is distancing itself in every possible way. Trump has repeatedly stated that supplying weapons to Ukraine will not lead to Ukraine’s victory, but it could escalate the conflict and draw America into a global war. Therefore, the White House is not even considering plans to increase aid.
Additionally, for both domestic and foreign policy reasons, Trump is unlikely to completely halt the aid that has already been promised. During a quarrel with Zelensky at the end of February, supplies were stopped for several days, which led to a crisis in relations between the United States and Europe.
It is difficult for the White House to completely refuse to help Ukraine for legal reasons. Approximately half of the promised supplies (the President’s Drawdown Authority (PDA) program for decommissioning equipment and weapons from U.S. Army depots) depends only on the president’s will. But the second half is the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) program.— involves the conclusion of firm contracts for the production of weapons by American companies. These weapons belong to Ukraine from the moment the contract is signed. In order to cancel the deliveries, Trump will need to prove to Congress that the weapons produced are necessary for other purposes in the United States.
At the end of last year, Biden allocated all the assistance allowed by law under both programs. As a result, if Trump does not decide to limit deliveries, Ukraine will receive more weapons (in value terms) in 2025 than in 2024. Moreover, the flow of supplies will not stop in 2026, although the assistance will likely become less flexible: the PDA program will end, and the production of weapons for Ukraine under the USAI program will continue. For example, the country will receive missiles for air defense systems and HIMARS MLRS, shells for howitzers, and so on. However, the supply of armored vehicles (infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers) will be limited. Meanwhile, the United States is the main supplier of armored vehicles to Ukraine (excluding tanks).
Additionally, the re-export of American weapons by other countries remains a concern. The possibility of such deliveries—which are a significant part of the Western coalition’s assistance—is unpredictable given the fluctuating sentiments within the Trump administration. For example, the United States refused to allow Australia to send the promised 49 Abrams tanks to Ukraine for several months. The permission was granted just before the Trump-Putin call.
Thus, in the context of sluggish negotiations, the most likely scenario is that the current level of U.S. aid will remain unchanged (with a gradual decrease as contracts signed under Biden are fulfilled). Europe is also unlikely to make a breakthrough, as the EU countries are primarily focused on rearming and strengthening their own armies rather than expanding aid to Ukraine. Even if they wanted to, they wouldn’t be able to fully replace U.S. supplies in several critical areas (air defense missiles, long-range strike systems, and armored vehicles).
Can Ukraine continue its resistance? And can Russia sustain the war for years, as Medinsky promised?
Tactical and operational challenges have long prevented both armies from making deep breakthroughs that could overwhelm their opponents. Units of the Russian Armed Forces and the Ukrainian Armed Forces deploy only a small part of their personnel at the front lines. The offensive is usually led by small (three to ten) groups of stormtroopers. Several such groups attack the positions of the same few (usually dozens of people) defenders.
Rarely, if a large open area needs to be crossed, armored groups with a larger (tens of soldiers) landing party are used. Success is not guaranteed: in recent weeks, both armies have lost armored vehicles and personnel in the area of Toretsk in attempts to break through the enemy’s defenses. First, the Russian Armed Forces launched an unsuccessful attack towards the southern outskirts of the city of Konstantinovka, and then the Ukrainian Armed Forces lost their armored group as they attempted to break through to the center of Toretsk.
The main forces of the units and formations are located in the near rear, and they are responsible for the use of high-precision strike weapons, primarily drones. It is the drones that prevent both armies from concentrating their forces for deep breakthroughs in the defense. Operations to encircle the enemy, breakthroughs to the rear, and other methods of crushing from the wars of the past are impossible in such conditions.
In the spring, the Ukrainian Armed Forces applied a new concept near Pokrovsk with relative success — the so-called drone line: a concentration of high-precision weapons (in the form of regiments and brigades of drones) capable of hitting all possible targets to a depth of 10-15 kilometers from the front. The goal is to interrupt the communication of advanced positions with the near rear. The Ukrainian army temporarily stopped the advance of the Russian Armed Forces to Pokrovsk and even counterattacked Russian units in places. The Russian command responded symmetrically by deploying a newly formed UAV regiment near Pokrovsk. This halted the Ukrainian counterattacks.
The Russian command used the same tactic with even greater success in the Kursk region. By early March, Russian drones had completely cut off the Ukrainian supply lines near Sudzha, leading to the collapse of the Ukrainian defense.
The increased use of drones has already changed the nature of the war. The role of artillery as the main means of destruction on the battlefield has decreased. This reduces Ukraine’s need for foreign supplies of artillery and millions of shells. However, as Ukrainian Armed Forces officers have noted in interviews with Western experts, it is impossible to completely eliminate the advantage of the Russian Armed Forces in terms of artillery and aviation firepower using drones. In addition, neither side can gain a long-term advantage in the use of unmanned systems, as the enemy quickly copies breakthrough technologies, such as fiber-optic drones or large drone operators. Drone countermeasures have consistently fallen behind in this technological race.
Previously, the Russian Armed Forces and the Ukrainian Armed Forces were both vulnerable to irreparable losses of armored vehicles. However, oddly enough, the growing role of drones indirectly helps the two armies solve this problem. Armored vehicles under drone strikes (and with remote mining using UAVs) are less and less effective, and therefore they are used less and less. The losses of the Russian Armed Forces in equipment in the first five months of this year are more than half as much as in 2024 (according to ukr.warspotting.net ). Russia is losing more equipment (with video evidence) than it can produce from scratch. However, the dependence on the state of its armored vehicle fleet is decreasing, as light mobile groups on motorcycles and ATVs are increasingly involved in attacks. Surprisingly, these groups are less vulnerable on a battlefield filled with drones than slow-moving armored vehicles with a large number of infantry soldiers. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are also increasingly using motorcycles for counterattacks.
In conditions of technological equality, the advantage goes to the side with the numerical superiority. Judging by the fragmentary data from both sides, the Russian Armed Forces continue to gain an advantage.
In the middle of 2024, the rate of recruitment of new contract soldiers sharply decreased (the data was obtained by studying the report on the implementation of the Russian budget for the three quarters of 2024, which includes an article on one-time payments to new recruits). However, after that, judging by the spending in 37 regions in different parts of the country (not all regions publish their reports), the rate increased again sharply, probably due to an increase in federal and regional “subscription bonuses.” If we extrapolate the data from the 37 regions to the entire country, the active army receives up to 1,000–1,500 new contract soldiers per day, or 30,000–45,000 per month. Irretrievable losses during this period, according to estimates by Medusa and Mediazona, amounted to 500-750 people per day. The Ukrainian Armed Forces (according to the Ukrainian authorities) recruited no more than 30,000 people per month.
At the same time, both opponents currently do not have large strategic reserves. All that can be used on the front immediately are units that were released after the battle for Sudzhu (while part of these troops are engaged in battles on the border of the Kursk and Sumy regions). The Armed Forces of Ukraine have already been forced to transfer one of the brigades from the Sumy region to the area of the Russian Armed Forces’ breakthrough between Pokrovsk and Toretsk. This breakthrough itself resembles the one created by the Russian army a year ago near Ocheretino, northwest of Avdiivka. With that (seemingly sluggish) Russian offensive, the problems of the Ukrainian Armed Forces began, ending with the loss of vast territories around Pokrovsk, Kurakhovo, Ugledara and Velikaya Novoselka.
This time, the target of the Russian offensive is the agglomeration of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, the center of the Ukrainian—controlled part of Donbass. Russia probably won’t be able to capture the entire territory of the four regions that the Kremlin is demanding from Ukraine in the coming months. However, new defeats could undermine Ukraine’s will to resist (and the West’s will to support Kyiv) and force it to make peace on its own terms.
