An armed rebellion in any country is possible for two main reasons. The first is structural problems in the state mechanism itself, which does not have sufficiently effective mechanisms for their resolution. The second reason is the intra-elite crisis, in which it is also impossible to develop a mechanism for overcoming contradictions.
As a rule (although it, like any rule in social systems, is relative), countries that are not yet states, in which there are no traditions of statehood, as well as countries that are assembled artificially – the probability of such events in them is always high. Latin America and Africa, plus the fragments of colonial empires in Asia, largely confirm this rule.
For established states, an armed rebellion is a consequence of their rapid degradation. Apparently, Russia belongs precisely to this type, and the events of recent days have the reason for the degradative properties of the entire system.
For this reason, the rebellion itself becomes only the first in a possible series of subsequent forceful attempts to redistribute, revise and re-determine what is no longer possible to do by the unarmed way. Moreover, in the course of degradation processes, the country was seized by an enduring and permanent crisis, from which there is literally no way out.
Such situations are always resolved according to two possible scenarios – the disintegration of the system into smaller ones, which will first lead to stabilization of the situation due to the fact that each elite group will be able to get its autonomous territory from others, and then the assembly will inevitably begin – either through power tools, or through relatively voluntary merger-acquisition. In the first case, the advantage will be given to the most aggressive, in the second – to those who can find a new and attractive source of development for others.
The second scenario is what is called a revolution. That is, a violent (and there is no other) overthrow of the ruling regime and the creation in its place of a regime capable of changing the model of development that led the system to disaster.
Hypothetically, there is a third story – slow “rotting”, but for Russia it is irrelevant – we are too big for it, there are many fault lines, there is a lot of diversity within one country, so “rotting” will still lead to one of the two mentioned scenarios.
Prigozhin’s rebellion marks the inability of the ruling elite to reach agreements within itself, and it doesn’t even matter – within the upper stratum of the nobility or between the upper and lower elite “floors”. All this is exacerbated by the rapid, literally before our eyes, degradation of the entire social system in all directions.
Will there be other rebellions? Now the likelihood of this has increased dramatically. If one can do it, why not try someone else? Not like Yevgeny Prigozhin, but no matter how – the power path becomes the shortest and most effective. And that means there will be others. However, Prigogine himself may well repeat. Unless, of course, the system fails to strangle him. Including in the physical sense.
In Rostov yesterday a mass sociological experiment-poll among the population spontaneously took place. And it turned out that there were no 80 percent of those who trusted President Putin among the population of Rostov. And this despite the fact that the great bwana had already appeared on television and angrily called the apostates traitors.
On the contrary, people happily fraternized, took pictures and posed in the background, had intimate conversations and ran to shake hands with Prigozhin, who was leaving in the car.
With portraits of Putin, no one went out to stop the tanks – in general, the change of power in the minds occurred literally instantly. I think that if Prigozhin had taken Moscow, he could easily have gathered a rally in Luzhniki on the theme “Let’s support the hope of Russia!”
So the figures of VTsIOMs and any other FOMs should be treated with the same trust that they deserve – that is, with zero.