General Director of the State Enterprise “Plant named after. V.A. Malysheva” Nikolay Belov
It is no secret that every autumn around the domestic armored industry (and around the national military-industrial complex as a whole) there comes a traditional “exacerbation of passions” associated with the adoption of the next State budget. Also traditionally, in relation to the section of this document entitled “Purchase and modernization of weapons and military equipment for the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” the spears break primarily around two samples of the Ukrainian “miracle weapon” – the T-84 main battle tank (MBT). “The Oplot combat vehicle and the An-70 military transport aircraft…
But about the sad epic of the An-70 some other time, for now we will dwell in more detail on the products developed by the enterprise “Kharkov Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau (KMDB) named after Alexander Alexandrovich Morozov” (chief – general designer, Lieutenant General Mikhail Borisyuk) and production Kharkov state enterprise “Plant named after Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Malyshev” (general director since August 2014 – Nikolay Belov; previously the company was headed by Vadim Fedosov) – MBT T-84UM “Oplot-M” and the deeply modernized MBT T-64BM “Bulat”.
T-64BM “Bulat”
The last five years have been a mixed bag for the designer and manufacturer of the T-64 and T-84. On the one hand, in April 2009, state tests of the next modification of the first of these vehicles, Oplot-M, were completed, and on May 28, 2009, this tank was officially put into service. On the other hand, the most successful year in the fate of the “eighty-four” on the domestic market is still quite distant 2001, when the Armed Forces of Ukraine acquired 10 T-84 units (at that time not only without the prefix “M”, but also without the name “Oplot”), who even solemnly paraded along Khreshchatyk at the parade in honor of the 10th anniversary of the country’s independence.
True, the success at that time was very peculiar: having received only 20% of the funds provided for under the contract of 78.8 million UAH, “Plant named after. V.A. Malyshev” in response to an offer to pay the rest of the money… received his tanks back. Four of them were subsequently (in 2003) sold to the United States (under the T-80UD brand, which in itself speaks of the real novelty of the T-84) as part of the American program for the purchase of weapons from potential enemies for the purpose of evaluating them.
BREM-84
Be that as it may, the T-84 has still not been included in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense program for the purchase of weapons, despite the readiness of the Armed Forces to purchase 10 units declared back in 2008. “Oplotov-M”, as well as 3 armored repair and recovery vehicles (BREM) on their base (BREM-84 “Atlet”; it was put into service in November 2008) and the presence of a special order of the third President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko on this matter . But “Plant im. V.A. Malyshev” signed a series of contracts with the Ukrainian Defense Ministry for the modernization of MBT models T-64B and T-64BK (the latter is the command version of the vehicle) to the level of the T-64BM “Bulat” In total, the State Development Program of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2006-2011. modernization to the level of Bulat BM 147 units was envisaged (and – a rare case – carried out). tanks T-64B and T-64BK, and plans for 2012-2015. provide for the modernization of another 223 vehicles.
As for the Oplot-M, the tank forces of the Ukrainian Ground Forces simply do not need this vehicle. There are two reasons for such a categorical conclusion. Firstly, Ukraine still retains a significant part (more than a third) of the huge tank fleet inherited from the former USSR, more than twice its needs: as of 01/01/2014, there were 2262 available. MBT with a maximum requirement (even taking into account the 50% reserve to make up for losses) of no more than 1100 vehicles. So new tanks are simply superfluous in states that are already overloaded with troops and storage bases. Secondly, some serious conversation about Oplot-M could be had if it were really a new tank, and not just another modification of the T- created 45 (!!) years ago (in 1969). 80. Finally, thirdly, this tank is simply too expensive: according to the “cost/effectiveness” criterion, upgrading the T-64B to the T-64BM Bulat is much (many times) preferable. Moreover, there is no need to adopt a new ARV – even if there is a deficiency in them (which is doubtful), then it is more expedient to use the chassis of existing tanks from surplus stocks to convert them into ARVs.
As for alternative modernization options, the T-64 and T-80UD can carry out (according to information from the Ukrainian tank builders themselves) almost the entire scope of modifications that are an advantage of the T-84 (including the installation of a 1200-horsepower 6TD-2E diesel engine). The only feature of Oplot that is difficult to “transplant” to these vehicles within the framework of the so-called. “limited modernization” is a welded turret with approximately 10% greater projectile resistance (and even then against all types of projectiles). But this alone is clearly not a sufficient basis for adopting the new MBT into service and into mass production.
So is it even worth “fencing the garden” with the purchase of new tanks in the foreseeable future? Indeed, in any case, the Oplot-M is clearly not ten times better than the Bulat (not to mention the possible modernization of the T-80UD) (although it will cost about an order of magnitude more – about 76 million UAH per vehicle; the cost of the Oplot “from 2001 to 2014, in dollar terms it increased threefold, and in hryvnia terms – even tenfold; increased in price in hryvnia “only” eight times). Accordingly, based on the “cost/effectiveness” criterion, re-adopting the T-84 into service is inappropriate. Another thing is that, as Ukrainian practice shows – under all presidents and all prime ministers, decisions to order any type of weapons or equipment for the needs of the national Armed Forces or to refuse such an order are, as a rule, not at all connected with the quality of these same samples and the real need for new “special products” of the Ground Forces, Air Forces and Navy…
Of course, all this does not mean that until the tank forces of Ukraine are brought to the proper state in terms of the level of combat training and technical serviceability of the vehicles, any modernization should be completely forgotten. For example, it would be advisable to install new elements of dynamic protection (“reactive armor”) “Knife” or “Knife-2” on existing tanks during factory repairs. It is also desirable to increase the number of commander-equipped vehicles in a tank battalion (with additional communications and navigation equipment) from 4 to 13 units. Speaking about the service life of tanks, it should be noted that the possibilities of extending it through well-organized overhauls are somewhat underestimated in our country.
Meanwhile, foreign experience provides interesting examples. Here is one of them: in 2008, General Dynamics Land Systems signed a contract with the United States Army worth $116 million to restore 204 units. MBT type M1 “General Abrams” according to the AIM standard. In accordance with AIM technology, Abrams tanks are completely disassembled into parts and, in the process of overhaul, are brought to a “new with zero (!) mileage” condition, which allows reducing the costs of their subsequent maintenance and repair, as well as maintaining a high level of their combat readiness. The restoration of all 204 tanks was completed by the end of 2009. Once again, I draw your attention to the cost of such a large-scale overhaul – it amounted to only about 0.57 million USD per tank.
What is the result? First and foremost, the main priority should be given to bringing the existing tank fleet and tank formations, units and subunits into combat-ready condition. The tank forces of the Ukrainian Ground Forces have more pressing needs (supply of ammunition, fuels and lubricants, spare parts, financing of factory repairs and so-called deep (also factory) forms of maintenance). But, unfortunately, they are far from being fully satisfied – for example, in 2013, only 237 out of 727 tank crews participated in live firing, and driving was practiced in only 36 (!!) vehicles. As of October 2009, the percentage of serviceability of the tank fleet of the national armed forces fell to 60% against the norm of 90% (and, according to available data, over the past five years the situation with the technical condition of armored vehicles not only has not improved, but has even worsened). Meanwhile, it is no secret that without the appropriate level of combat training of personnel and preservation in proper technical condition, a tank (like any other weapon system) is just a pile of more or less expensive scrap metal…
Secondly, it makes sense to talk about any serious modernization of Ukrainian MBTs only when the reserves for increasing the combat effectiveness of the existing fleet of equipment in its existing (or close to existing) configuration are completely exhausted. Third, as for the purchase of new tanks, the issue should be pushed back to an even longer term – it should be put on the agenda only after the reserve of modernization potential of existing vehicle models has been exhausted. And since this is a very distant (somewhere after 2030) prospect, such a new MBT should not be the “Oplot” (even with the M prefix) – by that time it will simply be completely obsolete.
However, this does not mean that there is no need to produce Oplot-M. Need to. For export. Moreover: this problem requires an urgent solution – as SLED.net.ua already wrote, as of October 1, 2014, not a single Oplot-M MBT has yet been produced under a contract worth about 240 million USD, providing for production of 49 of these vehicles for the Royal Thai Army. Although Ukrspetsexport signed a corresponding contract with the Thai Ministry of Defense on September 1, 2011…
This is all the more unpleasant because as a result, the fate of not only the contract itself, but also subsequent purchases of tanks from Ukraine by Thailand, was left in limbo. The possible total volume of these purchases was estimated at a very impressive amount, up to 200 units. Moreover, the choice fell on Oploty precisely because Bangkok already has positive experience in military-technical cooperation with Kiev (previously, the Thai army purchased 112 Ukrainian BTR-3E1 armored personnel carriers and technical assistance vehicles at its base, and then another 121 such armored personnel carriers).
But Oplot’s victory in the tender was by no means easy. According to the usually well-informed Bangkok Post, the Royal Thai Army, in addition to the offer from Ukraine, was also considering the possibility of acquiring the German Leopard-2A4 MBT, Russian T-90S Vladimir and South Korean K1A1 Rokit. But the technically preferable Leopards were considered too expensive. As for the T-90S, we must assume that the significantly higher price of this vehicle compared to the T-84U, in the absence of any obvious advantages of the Vladimir over the Oplot, led to the withdrawal of the Russian competitor from the tender.
The problem, however, is that the Ukrainian tank is more popular with Thai military officials, while the South Korean one had and still has a clearly predominant number of supporters among the Thai tank crews themselves (and the frontline military in Thailand traditionally has a very large weight in resolving such issues). The problem with Oplot is the automatic loader of the main armament – a 125-mm tank gun – a launcher for anti-tank guided missiles. Without giving any advantages in the rate of fire over manual loading (the same 6-8 rounds per minute), the automatic loader allows you to fire only 22 shots (this is determined by its capacity). After which you need to either load the remaining rounds of the ammunition rack (18) into the automatic loader (which takes time and also a complete stop of the tank), or switch to shooting with the same manual loading, only with a very low rate of this same shooting – only 1.5 rds/min. – and in this case the gunner also becomes a loader, which further reduces the effectiveness of the fire.
In addition, the automatic loader also has the disadvantage that when reloading the gun must be installed at a fixed angle (the so-called “ramming angle”) of approximately 5.5 degrees. Thus, it is not possible to fire from the Oplot cannon with a constant sight; after each shot, the gun must be aimed again. All this greatly limits both the range and especially the real combat effectiveness of the T-84U. In fact, its only practically significant advantages in the specific conditions of Thailand over the South Korean K1A1 are the price (according to unofficial data, the Ukrainian tank costs about 200 thousand USD cheaper) and slightly larger ammunition (40 rounds versus 32), but the latter circumstance is depreciated by the above-described features of use this ammunition.
But in general, if you compare the tactical and technical characteristics and the price of Ukrainian and South Korean products, it is not difficult to come to the conclusion that termination of the contract with Ukraine in favor of Rokita in the event of further delays in the supply of Oplots to Thailand is a very, very real prospect. However, we’ll wait and see…
In the meantime, a few words about the notorious (but always – well, almost always – present) “interest of diamonds.” Which of the Ukrainian officials, industrialists and generals benefits from the purchase of Oplots for the Ukrainian Armed Forces? At the risk of being “beaten with slippers,” first of all, here I would like to say a word in defense of such an unpopular class as the generals – they (unfortunately) do NOT solve this issue here.
No, this does not mean at all that there are no idiots and thieves among the Ukrainian generals – both of them (as well as “harmoniously” combining both of these unworthy qualities) are found among them (the Ukrainian generals) in very great abundance (which is confirmed by the arrest On November 22 of this year, the now former head of the department of public procurement and supply of material resources of the Ministry of Defense, accused of a “modest” gamble” with diesel fuel for the amount of 443 million UAH). But since 1992, it has been the case in Ukraine that the issue of supplying the national armed forces with new types of weapons, military and special equipment is decided not by the country’s Ministry of Defense, but by completely different authorities – the president (with an “active” and, of course, “not without sin” with the participation of its Secretariat/Administration), the Prime Minister (with the same “active participation” of the Cabinet of Ministers’ apparatus) and the leadership and central apparatus of the ministry in charge of the military-industrial complex (These were different government departments over the years; now it is MEDT – the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine). Four years ago (in December 2010), the state concern Ukroboronprom was added to them. By the way, it is interesting to note that, let’s say, the “overhead costs” of the above-mentioned concern when executing arms contracts after the “Revolution of Dignity” increased by a third – from 30% to 40% of the total contract cost… Truly – a “worthy revolutionary achievement”!…
But this is, so to speak, the “general part”. But here is a specific (although, of course, far from complete) list of those who will benefit from the “unfreezing” in 2015 of a contract dating back to 2010 for the purchase of 10 units for the Ukrainian Army. MBT “Oplot-M” (current transaction amount – 760 million UAH, then – 650 million UAH) and 3 units. BREM-84 “Athlete” (the current transaction amount is UAH 84 million; for all this money it would be possible to modernize 119 (!!) T-64B type MBTs to the level of the T-64BM “Bulat”; for comparison : a tank brigade has 94 such vehicles in service, a mechanized brigade has 31 or 62):
Head – General Designer of the State Enterprise KMDB named after. A.A. Morozov, Lieutenant General Mikhail Borisyuk;
General Director of the State Enterprise “Plant named after. V.A. Malysheva” Nikolay Belov (the plant’s interest in the production of the Oplot BM is also due to the fact that the profitability of this project is determined at 25%; for the modernization of the T-64, this figure is only 7.5% – because there are enterprises capable of offering the same service; in their at one time this forced the V.A. Malyshev Plant to reduce the price bid for the Bulat project by 28.5%);
General Director of the state concern “Ukrobonprom” Roman Romanov;
Director of the Department of Economics of Defense and Security of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (this department is the successor to the Ministry of Industrial Policy of Ukraine) Petr Nebotov;
acting Minister of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine Valery Pyatnitsky;
Prime Minister of Ukraine Arseniy Yatsenyuk (publicly “signed” for the Kharkov “armored body” back in June of this year).
Well, we should also sympathize with the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko: at the instigation of officials of his Administration, during an October 2014 visit to Kharkov, he already described the “Oplot” (along with the “cracked” BTR-4) as “the best, most modern example of Ukrainian weapons.” And now for the President, “working back” is a process fraught with considerable internal political costs. So for now, the Oplot case seems to be “living and winning.” But the tank crews of the Ukrainian Armed Forces have absolutely no benefit from this. Besides harm. And – great harm.
* – According to legend, the monarch of Siam (the former name of Thailand), when he wanted to ruin one of his dignitaries, gave him a white elephant.
Sergey MIDDELDORF, especially for NEXT.net.ua
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