How many bombers did Ukraine destroy as part of the SBU operation? What drones were used in the attack? And what could Russia’s response be? We answer the main questions about Operation Spiderweb

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The sabotage by the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), which targeted Russian strategic and long-range aviation bases, was brilliantly executed and humiliating for the Kremlin. However, it is unlikely to have any significant impact on the course or outcome of the war. It is still unclear how many aircraft were destroyed. However, all available evidence suggests that the losses are significantly lower than the 40+ bombers claimed by the SBU. The loss of 10-13 aircraft (as confirmed by photos and videos) means a 10% decrease in the number of such aircraft capable of taking off. However, it should be noted that long-range aviation was used very limitedly in the war with Ukraine. Within the “nuclear triad” of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces, its role was also the most modest.

How many aircraft were shot down by the SBU?

• According to objective data (video and satellite images), at the Belaya air base in At least 10 Tu-95MS and Tu-22M bombers were hit in the Irkutsk region and Olenye in the Murmansk region.
• At the same time, satellite images from the Olenya airbase have not yet been published. All aircraft losses on it are known only from drone videos provided by the SBU itself. The videos show three destroyed bombers and one military transport plane.
• In one of the videos, a person who is likely working for the fire department at Belaya Air Base claims that eight planes were destroyed, while visual evidence (including published satellite images) confirms the loss of seven bombers.
• Interestingly, the Belaya airbase also housed Tu-160 supersonic strategic bombers (which are significantly more expensive and advanced than the Tu-95), but they were not targeted.
• Two other airbases, Ivanovo-Severny (home to the A-50 radar detection and control aircraft) and Dyagilevo (which includes the Tu-95), were also targeted, according to the SBU. But no videos have been published so far.
• It is likely that the number of destroyed aircraft (41 bombers) reported by the SBU is significantly inflated.

Were simple FPV drones used in the attack?

Not really. On the front lines in Ukraine, both armies use similar drones, but they are controlled by radio signals. Because of this, they can usually only fly up to 15 kilometers from the operator’s location. Recently, both sides (especially the Ukrainian Armed Forces) have been using repeaters mounted on heavy drones, which has increased the range of small kamikaze drones to 20 or even 30 kilometers. However, it appears that in the case of attacks on Russian air bases, the operators were thousands of kilometers away from the target.

Most likely, the drones (as well as the mechanism that opened the roof of the container in which the UAVs were located before takeoff) were equipped with a mobile communication modem (with a Russian SIM card). In addition, a commercial ArduPilot autopilot for UAVs was installed on the drones’ computers, as can be seen in the control system interface in the videos published by the SBU. The autopilot is needed to eliminate the difficulties associated with delays and other communication problems when controlling drones from a long distance via mobile communication.

This is not a new development: mobile communication in enemy territory has previously been used by both the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Russian Armed Forces (on later versions of the long-range Geran drones equipped with a video camera). However, the most challenging aspect of this operation is the complex form of the special operation itself: the drones were equipped with explosives inRussia launched them right near the target (probably without any assistance from people on the ground near the air bases).

The complex shape almost eliminates the possibility of scaling up such attacks: according to Ukrainian officials, this particular strike was planned for a year and a half; it is doubtful that the trucks filled with drones can be used again. However, small drones with mobile communication modems, due to their low cost and availability, as well as the lack of simple countermeasures, can pose a security challenge not only in Russia and Ukraine, but also in other countries.

• In Ukraine, efforts are being made to filter traffic in mobile networks to prevent their use for controlling enemy drones (the effectiveness of these measures is unknown).
• InIn Russia, such threats are dealt with by disabling mobile communications to protect important political events (such as the May 9, 2025 parade in Moscow) or critical facilities. However, total disconnections are not possible due to socio-economic reasons.

It is possible that the Russian authorities will now disable communications near air bases more frequently, at least when a large number of aircraft are present.

What damage has the sabotage caused to the Russian military machine? And how much will it hinder the Russian Armed Forces’ offensive in Ukraine?

The strikes will have little direct impact on the course of the war, even if the losses in bombers are significantly higher than confirmed by visual evidence.

• The Tu-95 (along with the unattacked Tu-160) forms the backbone of Russia’s strategic aviation forces. Traditionally, this part of the nuclear triad in the Russian army is the weakest, compared to the ground-based, underground, and submarine systems. It plays a more symbolic role. However, unlike the submarine strategic missile carriers and the intercontinental ballistic missile systems, aircraft can be used as carriers of conventional weapons, primarily cruise missiles.
• Similarly, the main role of the Tu-22 long-range bombers, which are not part of the strategic forces, is to strike enemy aircraft carriers with nuclear weapons. However, they can also be used for free-fall bombing (which is not an option in the current war due to the threat of air defense) and cruise missiles.

This is exactly how the bombers were used in the war against Ukraine. However, their role was more of a supporting one: in recent years, the Russian Armed Forces have increasingly relied on ballistic missiles and long-range drones. This is partly due to the vulnerability of cruise missiles to enemy air defense and fighter aircraft, and partly due to the shortage of missiles themselves. In any case, the Russian army had an excessive number of bombers for this role in the war (given the same shortage of missiles).

Since the first year of the war, bombers have proved vulnerable to attacks on their bases. In previous strikes by long-range Ukrainian drones on airfields, several Tu-22s and one Tu-95 have already been lost or damaged. That is why the Russian command began to “hide” them at distant air bases in Siberia and on The Kola Peninsula. Before the latest attack on Ukraine, several bombers were deployed to airfields in central Russia.

It is doubtful that a diversion using truck-mounted drones will dramatically change the tactics of long-range aviation in the war with Ukraine.

And yet, these bombers are part of the strategic nuclear forces. Shouldn’t Russia respond to the attack with a nuclear strike?

No, it shouldn’t. In recent years, the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons has indeed been lowered in the guidelines for nuclear deterrence policy. This includes the inclusion of massive drone attacks as a reason for a nuclear retaliatory strike.

However, the doctrine does not oblige the Russian leadership to follow strict algorithms when making decisions about a nuclear strike. Instead, they are free to act on the circumstances. Secondly, even the latest hard-line version of the “Fundamentals…” does not provide unambiguous indications of reaching the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in relation to the current sabotage: drone strikes on air bases have not led to “disruption of the nuclear forces’ retaliatory actions”—and even less so to a threat to “the very existence of the state.”

The strike (with impunity) on the “nuclear triad” bases is important from the perspective of military-strategic discourse. For several years now, politicians in the West have been discussing whether it is possible to cross Putin’s “red lines”: whether the Kremlin’s nuclear threats (both explicitly expressed and hinted) should be taken into account when making decisions on new aid to Ukraine — or you should consider them a bluff and act accordingly. The SBU is probably trying to prove that the second interpretation is true.